A

VIEW

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

PHILOSOPHY;

In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

LETTER the FOURTH and LAST.

LONDON,
Printed for JOHN and PAUL KNAPTON,
in *Ludgate-Street*.
MDCCLV.

LETTER IV.

DEAR SIR,

YOU will wonder to hear again from me on ſo trifling a ſubject as this FIRST PHILOSOPHY. And had not lord BOLINGBROKE brought us to this alternative, either to give up the BIBLE, or his LORDSHIP, to contempt, I ſhould willingly have left him in poſſeſſion of his Admirers.

My laſt Letter examined his Lordſhip's value in every point of *view*, in which a PHILOSOPHER would deſire to ſhine. I ſhall now puſh my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own Province. I ſhall beg leave to try his talents in his POLITICAL capacity, as an Analyſer of States, a Balancer of Power, and a Diſtributer of Civil and Religious Sanctions.

But now I muſt recede a little from the method I have hitherto obſerved, which was to defend, not *this or that body of Divines*, but the *general Principles of natural and revealed Religion*, againſt his Lordſhip's calumnies: Here I ſhall have occaſion to patroniſe a ſingle Clergyman; and not ſuch a one neither as I could have wiſhed; a CUDWORTH, a CLARKE, a CUMBERLAND, or a TILLOTSON; (eſtabliſhed Names, which the Public are ready to make their own quarrel) but a Writer of very ambiguous fame,

the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moſes*, and, of *The Alliance between Church and State*: Of whom, I pretend to know little but from the talk of his Adverſaries; his Friends poſſeſſing him, as they do a good Conſcience, in ſilence and complacency; and from his Adverſaries I learn—"But hold, you will ſay, let us drop both his Friends and his Enemies, and hear what the learned abroad ſay of him; for his works have been frequently tranſlated and criticiſed both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from Strangers who are without ſelfiſh partialities and perſonal prejudices."—Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that deciſion: Foreign Critics of the greateſt name have ſpoken ſo differently of him, from the Scriblers at home, that was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would ſuſpect their encomiums for the civilities of his moſt partial Friends. So to his Adverſaries, I ſay again, I will have recourſe: And, from them I learn that he abounds in Paradoxes, that he delights in Refinements, and would fain paſs upon the World a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digeſted learning: that, on his firſt appearance, he was ſhrewdly ſuſpected of infidelity; but that (no body knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a ſort of friend to Religion; indeed, in his own way: I

ſuppoſe

ſuppoſe he ſees it for his Intereſt to ſtick to the eſtabliſhed Church; for I know no other reaſon why there ſhould have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the repreſentation of his Enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, *The Dunces, of all denominations, being in Confederacy againſt him.* Indeed, ſince his Lordſhip's diſcovery of a *Confederacy* between *Divines* and *Atheiſts*, the word is likely to become as ridiculous as the word *Ode*, which our Laureate foretells, no body, for the future, will hear without laughing. However, it is ſcarce worth while to retract it; for were there no more in this *confederacy*, than in his Lordſhip's; and that every individual Blockhead only followed the bent of his natural bias, it would but make the wonder the greater.

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with: In truth I could not find another, ſo proper for my purpoſe, which was, as I ſaid, to diſplay Lord Bolingbroke's *political* talents. For tho' his Lordſhip be very profuſe in his ill Language to all Men, who have undertaken

the defence of *Religion* and *Church Government*; yet the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* is the only one whom he does more than abuſe on this account. For while he keeps at a reſpectful diſtance from the *Arguments* of others, he comes boldly, up to this Writer's, and ſits down before them in form. He Diſputes with him, the Knowledge of the *Unity*—the ſenſe and reaſon of a *ſelect people*—of a *tutelary Deity*—of *compliance with human prejudices*, and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This ſeems not greatly for his Lordſhip's honour; after he had defied all the mighty Chieftains of Literature, to decline the combat, and think himſelf quit by accepting the Gauntlet from this puny Writer.

His Lordſhip begins his attack on that capital circumſtance, in the Jewiſh Oeconomy, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE: He pretends to account for it independently of the EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL PROVIDENCE, which Moſes aſſured his people was to be adminiſtred under a *Theocracy*; and which the Author of the *Divine Legation* attempts to prove, from

from this very circumſtance of the *Omiſſion*, was actually adminiſtered.

But to make this intelligible to the common Reader, it will be neceſſary to give a ſummary View, of that famous Argument, purſued at large thro' two volumes of the *Divine Legation*; and yet conceived by many of the Learned, to be left imperfect.

RELIGION has been always held neceſſary to the ſupport of CIVIL SOCIETY; and, a FUTURE STATE, (under the common diſpenſation of Providence) as neceſſary to RELIGION; becauſe, nothing but a *future ſtate* can remove the objections to God's moral Government, under ſuch a Providence; whoſe phenomena are apt to diſturb every ſerious Profeſſor of Religion; as it is of the eſſence of religious profeſſion, to believe that *God is a rewarder of thoſe who diligently ſeek him.*

MOSES, who inſtituted a *Religion* and a *Republic*, and incorporated them together, ſtands ſingle amongſt ancient and modern Lawgivers, in teaching a *Religion* WITHOUT the ſanction, or even the mention, of a *Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments.* The ſame MOSES, by uniting

the Religion and the Republic of the Jews, into one ſyſtem, made God, by conſequence, their ſupreme civil magiſtrate; whereby the form of Government became truly and properly THEOCRATICAL.

The conſequence of a *Theocratic* adminiſtration muſt be an *extraordinary* or EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And ſo, indeed, the Jewiſh Lawgiver, throughout his whole Inſtitute, has repreſented it to be.

The queſtion between Infidels and Believers has ever been, whether this *extraordinary Providence* was REAL or only PRETENDED?

Here the Author of the *Divine Legation* ſteps in; and undertakes to prove, from the circumſtance of the *omiſſion of a future ſtate*, that it was REAL. His Argument ſtands thus:

If Religion be neceſſary to Civil Government, and if Religion cannot ſubſiſt, under the *common* diſpenſation of Providence, without a *future ſtate* of rewards and puniſhments, ſo conſummate a Lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of ſuch a State, unleſs he had been well aſſured that an *extraordinary Providence* was in reality to be adminiſtred

niſtred over his People: or were it poſſible he had been ſo infatuated, the miſchief of a Religion wanting a future ſtate, would have been ſoon felt by the People, to the deſtruction of their REPUBLIC; which nevertheleſs continued Sovereign, and in a flouriſhing condition, for many ages.

This is the plain and ſimple ARGUMENT of the *Divine Legation*; which the firſt and the ſecond Volumes of that Work are employed to explain, and illuſtrate. And it muſt be owned, Lord Bolingbroke ſaw it in its force; as appears from his various contrivances to evade it.

This praiſe it would be unjuſt to deny him, when others have underſtood ſo little of the *Argument*, as to imagine that the two firſt Volumes had left it unfiniſhed; and that the *third* was to contain the *concluſion of the Syllogiſm*; tho' the Author had told us, more than once, that the purpoſe of the laſt Volume was only to INFORCE the various parts of the foregoing ARGUMENT, by many new conſiderations; to REMOVE OBJECTIONS to the Character of *Moſes*; and to EXPLAIN THE REASONS of the *omiſſion*.

To evade, as we ſay, this Argument, his Lordſhip caſts about for a reaſon, independent of the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for Moſes's OMISSION of a *future ſtate*. And his firſt ſolution is this,

" MOSES DID NOT BELIEVE THE IM-
" MORTALITY OF THE SOUL, nor the
" rewards and puniſhments of another
" life, tho' it is poſſible he might have
" learnt theſe Doctrines from the Egyp-
" tians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EAR-
" LY, perhaps as they taught that of the
" Unity of God. When I ſay, *that Mo-*
" *ſes did not believe the immortality of the*
" *ſoul*, nor future rewards and puniſhments,
" my reaſon is this; that he taught nei-
" ther, when *he had to do with a people*
" *whom a Theocracy could not reſtrain*;
" and on whom, therefore, terrors of Pu-
" niſhment, *future* as well as preſent,
" *eternal* as well as temporary, could ne-
" ver be too much multiplied, or too ſtrong-
" ly inculcated [1]."

This reaſoning can never be too much admired.

[1] Vol. iii. p. 289.

Here

Here we have a *Doctrine*, plauſible in itſelf, and therefore of eaſy admittance; Moſt alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; Of higheſt account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Iſraelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners; Of ſtrongeſt efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indiſpenſable uſe; Yet, all this notwithſtanding, *Moſes did not believe it, and, on that account, would not teach it.* What a Politician has his Lordſhip made of this MOSES, a Brother Legiſlator, inſpired only by his natural genius, like himſelf. But now, had MOSES's *integrity* been ſo ſevere, How came he to write a Hiſtory which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at leaſt, a fiction of his own? Did he *believe* that? How came he to leave the Iſraelites, as my Lord affirms he did, in poſſeſſion of many of the ſuperſtitious opinions of Egypt? Did he believe them too? No, but they ſerved his purpoſe, which was, The better governing an unruly People. Well, but his Lordſhip tells us, the doctrine of a *future ſtate*, ſerved this purpoſe beſt of all; for *having to do with a People whom a Theocracy could*

not reſtrain, terrors of puniſhment, FUTURE *as well as preſent,* ETERNAL *as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too ſtrongly inculcated.* No matter for that. MOSES, as other men may, on a ſudden grows ſcrupulous; and ſo, togegether with the principles of common politics, throws aſide the principles of common ſenſe; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which beſt ſerved his purpoſe; was moſt innocent in itſelf, and moſt important in its *general,* as well as particular, uſe.

In his Lordſhip's next Volume, this *Omiſſion* comes again upon the ſtage; and there we have *another* reaſon aſſigned for MOSES's conduct in this matter.

" MOSES would not teach the Doctrine " of the immortality of the ſoul, and of a " future ſtate, *on account of the many ſu-* " *perſtitions* which this Doctrine had begot " in Egypt, as we muſt believe, or *be-* " *lieve that he knew nothing of it,* or AS- " SIGN SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR HIS " OMISSION [2]."

[4] Vol. iv. p. 470.

We

We have ſeen before, that MOSES omitted a *future ſtate*, becauſe he did not believe it. This reaſon is now out of date; and one or other of the three following is to be aſſigned; either, becauſe it *begot ſuperſtitions*; or becauſe *he knew nothing of it*; or becauſe HE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* providence; that being what he means, by the *whimſical reaſon* aſſigned, [by the Author of the *Divine Legation*] *for its omiſſion.*

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting he will ſtand to it, and having ſhewn, his *two firſt* reaſons not worth a ruſh, leave the *laſt* eſtabliſhed even on his own conceſſions.

1. *Moſes*, ſays he, *omitted a future ſtate on account of the many ſuperſtitions, which this doctrine had begot in Egypt.* But if the *omiſſion* ſtood upon this principle, MOSES muſt have omitted an infinite number of rites and doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke ſays, he borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordſhip's opinion, were thoſe very ſuperſtitions, this *Doctrine had begot*; ſuch as the notion of *tutelary deities*; and in part, others

others ariſing out of thoſe; ſuch as the *diſtinction between things clean and unclean*, an *hereditary Prieſthood*, *ſacerdotal habits*, and *Rites of ſacrifice*.

2. However, he has another reaſon for the omiſſion: MOSES *might know nothing of it*. To which if I only oppoſed his Lordſhip's own words in another place, it might be deemed ſufficient; where, giving us the reaſons why MOSES did *know ſomething* of a future ſtate, he obſerves, there are *certain rites, which ſeem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine* [5]. But I go further, and obſerve, that, from the very LAWS of MOSES themſelves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongſt the Laws againſt Gentile Divinations, there is one againſt that ſpecies of them, called by the Greeks NECROMANCY, or *invocation of the dead*; which neceſſarily implies, in the Lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uſes it, the *knowledge of a future ſtate*.

3. This being the fate of his Lordſhip's two reaſons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own in-

[5] Vol. v. p. 239.

ventions,

ventions, that is, to take up with SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR THE OMISSION: which, however, is ſomething better than the *no reaſons* of his Lordſhip's providing.

But, his Lordſhip diſſatisfied, as well he might, with the ſolutions hitherto offered, returns again to the charge, in the *Corona operis*, his book of FRAGMENTS: And there, he more openly oppoſes the doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reaſon, before given, for the *omiſſion*; namely, *the many ſuperſtitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt*.

"ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE (ſays his Lordſhip) a doctrine ſo "uſeful to ALL Religion, and therefore "incorporated into ALL the Syſtems of "Paganiſm, left wholly out of that of "the JEWS. Many probable reaſons "might be brought to ſhew, that it was "an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode, "and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, ſo ſoon, at leaſt, afterwards, by all thoſe who were inſtructed like MOSES, in the wiſdom of "that people. He tranſported much of "his Wiſdom into the ſcheme of Religion

"and

" and Government, which he gave the
" Iſraelites; and, amongſt other things,
" certain Rites, which may ſeem to allude,
" or have a remote relation to, this very
" doctrine. Tho' this doctrine therefore,
" had not been that of ABRAHAM, ISAAC,
" and JACOB, He might have adopted it
" with as little ſcruple, as he did many
" cuſtoms and inſtitutions merely Egyp-
" tian. He had to do with a rebellious,
" but a ſuperſtitious, people. In the firſt
" Character, they made it neceſſary that
" he ſhould neglect nothing which
" might add weight to his ordinances, and
" contribute to keep them in awe. In
" the ſecond, their diſpoſition was ex-
" tremely proper to receive ſuch a doc-
" trine, and to be influenced by it. *Shall*
" *we ſay that an hypotheſis of future rewards*
" *and puniſhments, was uſeleſs amongſt a*
" *People who lived under a Theocracy*, and
" that the future Judge of other People,
" was their immediate Judge and King,
" who reſided in the midſt of them, and
" who dealed out rewards and puniſh-
" ments on every occaſion? Why then
" were ſo many precautions taken? Why
" was a ſolemn covenant made with God,
" as

" as with a temporal Prince? Why were
" ſo many promiſes and threatnings of re-
" wards and puniſhments, temporal in-
" deed, but future and contingent, as we
" find in the book of Deuteronomy, moſt
" pathetically held out by MOSES? Would
" there have been any more impropriety in
" holding out thoſe of one kind than thoſe
" of another, becauſe the ſupreme Being,
" who diſpoſed and ordered both, was in
" a particular manner preſent amongſt
" them? Would an addition to the cata-
" logue, of rewards and puniſhments more
" remote, but eternal, and in all reſpects
" far greater, have had no effect? I think
" neither of theſe things can be ſaid.

" What ſhall we ſay then? How came
" it to paſs, this addition was not made?
" I will mention what occurs to me, and
" ſhall not be over ſollicitous about the
" weight that my reflexions may deſerve.
" If the doctrines of the immortality of
" the ſoul, and of a future ſtate, had
" been revealed to MOSES, that he might
" teach them to the Iſraelites, he would
" have taught them moſt certainly. But
" he did not teach them. They were

" there-

" therefore not revealed to him. Why
" they were not ſo revealed ſome PERT
" DIVINE or other will be ready to tell
" you. For me, I dare not preſume to
" gueſs. But this, I may preſume to ad-
" vance, that ſince theſe Doctrines were
" not revealed by God to his ſervant Mo-
" SES, it is highly probable that this Le-
" giſlator made a ſcruple of teaching them
" to the Iſraelites, how well ſoever in-
" ſtructed he might be in them himſelf,
" and howſoever uſeful to Government he
" might think them. The ſuperſtitions
" and idolatrous rites of the Egyptians,
" like thoſe of other nations, were found-
" ed on the Polytheiſm, and the Mytho-
" logy that prevailed, and were ſuffered
" to prevail, amongſt the Vulgar, and that
" made the ſum of their Religion. It
" ſeemed to be a point of policy to direct
" all theſe abſurd opinions and practices
" to the ſervice of Government, inſtead of
" attempting to root them out. But then
" the great difference between rude and
" ignorant nations, and ſuch as were ci-
" vilized and learned, like the Egyptians,
" ſeems to have been this, that the for-
" mer had no other ſyſtem of Religion
" than

" than theſe abſurd opinions and practices,
" whereas the latter had an inward as well
" as an outward Doctrine. There is rea-
" ſon to believe that natural Theology and
" natural Religion had been taught and
" practiſed in the ancient Theban Dyna-
" ſty; and it is probable that they conti-
" nued to be an *inward* doctrine in the
" reſt of Egypt, while Polytheiſm, Ido-
" latry, and all the MYSTERIES, all the
" impieties, and all the follies of Magic,
" were the *outward* doctrine. MOSES
" might be let into a knowledge of both;
" and under the patronage of the Princeſs,
" whoſe Foundling he was, he might be
" initiated into thoſe *Myſteries*, where the
" ſecret doctrine alone was taught, and
" the outward exploded. But we cannot
" imagine that the Children of Iſrael, in
" general, enjoyed the ſame privilege, nor
" that the Maſters were ſo laviſh, to their
" Slaves, of a favour ſo diſtinguiſhed, and
" often ſo hard to obtain. No. The
" Children of Iſrael knew nothing more
" than the outſide of the Religion of
" Egypt, and if the doctrine, we ſpeak of,
" was known to them, it was known
" only in the ſuperſtitious rites, and with

" all the fabulous circumſtances in which
" it was dreſſed up and preſented to vul-
" gar belief. It would have been hard
" therefore to teach, or to renew this
" Doctrine in the minds of the Iſraelites,
" without giving them an occaſion the
" more, to recall the polytheiſtical fables,
" and practice the idolatrous Rites they
" had learnt during their Captivity. Rites
" and Ceremonies are often ſo equivocal,
" that they may be applied to very differ-
" ent doctrines. But when they are ſo
" cloſely connected with one Doctrine
" that they are not applicable to another,
" to teach the Doctrine is, in ſome ſort, to
" teach the Rites and Ceremonies, and to
" authorize the fables on which they are
" founded. MOSES therefore being at
" liberty to teach this doctrine of rewards
" and puniſhments in a future ſtate, or
" not to teach it, might very well chooſe
" the latter; tho' he indulged the Iſraelites,
" on account of the hardneſs of their
" hearts, and by the divine permiſſion, as
" it is preſumed, in ſeveral obſervances
" and cuſtoms which did not lead directly,
" tho' even they did ſo perhaps in conſe-

"quence, to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry "of Egypt [6]."

What a Babel of reaſoning has his Lordſhip here heaped up, with the rubbiſh of falſe and inconſiſtent principles, only to inſult the Temple of God, and the Fortreſs of Mount Sion! Sometimes, he repreſents MOSES as a divine Meſſenger; and diſtinguiſhes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, *a future ſtate not being revealed to* MOSES *was the reaſon he did not teach it.* Sometimes again, he conſiders him as a mere human Lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of Religion and Politics from the Egyptians, in whoſe recondite Learning he had been intimately inſtructed; and then, the reaſon of the *omiſſion* is, *leſt the Doctrine of a future ſtate ſhould have drawn* the *Iſraelites into thoſe Egyptian ſuperſtitions*, from which, it was MOSES's purpoſe to ſet them free. All theſe inconſiſtencies in *Fact* and *Reaſoning*, his Lordſhip delivers in the ſame breath, and without the leaſt intimation of any change in his Principles or Opinions.

[6] Vol. v. p. 238---9—40—41.

But let us examine this wonderful Paragraph ſtep by ſtep, without troubling our heads about his Lordſhip's real ſentiments; it being indifferent, to this *View* of his talents, what he believed: It is ſufficient, that we confute all he ſays, whether under his own, or any other aſſumed Character.

He begins with owning, that ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE, *a doctrine ſo uſeful to* ALL *Religions, and therefore incorporated into* ALL *the Syſtems of Paganiſm, left wholly out of that of the Jews.*

It ſeems then, that this OMISSION is, after all, no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by MOSES's *diſbelief* of the doctrine; his *ignorance*; or the *imaginary miſchiefs* it might produce. We may therefore be allowed to ſay, it deſerves the moſt ſerious attention: at leaſt, all the pains, the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moſes* has beſtowed upon it. And if the *Omiſſion* be ſo wonderful, a little *whimſical* reaſoning upon it, tho' it end in a demonſtration of the truth of Revelation, may be forgiven. And, if I might make ſo free with the delicacy of theſe

times,

times, I would ſay, it is, on the whole, as well perhaps to be WHIMSICAL and conſiſtent, as even to be FASHIONABLE, when at the charge of Common Senſe.

His Lordſhip proceeds to ſhew, in direct oppoſition to what he ſaid before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future ſtate, becauſe the Egyptians taught it: His knowledge of it, (my Lord tells us) further appears from an *internal* circumſtance, *ſome of his rites ſeeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine.* This I obſerve, to his Lordſhip's credit. The remark is accurate and fair. But we are in no want of his *remote relation*; I have ſhewn juſt above, that the jewiſh Laws againſt *Necromancy neceſſarily* imply Moſes's knowledge of the Doctrine.

His Lordſhip then goes on to explain the advantages, which, humanly ſpeaking, the Iſraelites muſt have received from this doctrine, in the temper and circumſtances, in which they left Egypt. MOSES, ſays he, *had to do with a rebellious and a ſuperſtitious People.*—This likewiſe, I obſerve, to his Lordſhip's credit, has the ſame marks of ſagacity and truth; and brings

us to the very verge of the *Solution*, propoſed by the Author of the *Divine Legation*; which is, that the Iſraelites were indeed under an *extraordinary Providence*, which ſupplied all the advantages that could be had from the doctrine of a *future ſtate*.

Under a *common and unequal* Providence, Religion cannot ſubſiſt without this doctrine: For Religion implying a juſt retribution of reward and puniſhment, which under ſuch a Providence is not diſpenſed, a *future ſtate* muſt needs ſubvene, to prevent the whole Edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the *fact*, which his Lordſhip ſo amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future ſtate was moſt uſeful to* ALL *Religions, and therefore incorporated into* ALL *the Religions of Paganiſm.* But where an *extraordinary and equal* Providence is adminiſtered, good and evil are exactly diſtributed; and ſo, a future ſtate, in this circumſtance, is not neceſſary for the ſupport of Religion. A future ſtate is not to be found in the Moſaic Oeconomy; yet this Oeconomy ſubſiſted for many ages: Religion therefore did not

not need it; or, in other words, it was ſupported by an *extraordinary Providenc.*

This is the argument of the *Divine Legation.* Let us now conſider his Lordſhip's neweſt attempts to evade it.

Shall we ſay, that an Hypotheſis of future rewards and puniſhments was uſeleſs amongſt a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, *and that the future Judge of other People was their immediate Judge and King, who reſided in the midſt of them, and who dealed out rewards and puniſhments on every occaſion?* WHY THEN WERE SO MANY PRECAUTIONS *taken?* &c.

The PRECAUTIONS here objected to us, are to inſinuate *againſt the truth* of Moſes's Promiſe of an extraordinary Providence. A kind of SOPHISM which his Lordſhip only advances, and holds in common with the reſt, who have written againſt the *Divine Legation:* and which I ſhall here, after much forbearance on the Author's part, expoſe as it deſerves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his People were under an extraordinary Providence. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a ſelf evident truth, it wants to be proved: Till then, the *Unbeliever* is at

liberty to urge any circumſtance in the Jewiſh Law or Hiſtory, which may ſeem to bring the reality of that Providence into queſtion: The ſame liberty too, has the *Believer*; if at leaſt, he can perſuade himſelf (as they ſeem to have done, who have written againſt the *Divine Legation)* that his profeſſion will allow him to do it with decency. Things were in this ſtate, when the Author of the *Divine Legation* undertook the defenſe of MOSES: And to cut off at one ſtroke, all objections to the Legiſlator's credit, ariſing from any doubtful or unfavourable circumſtance in the Law or Hiſtory of the Jews, concerning this *extraordinary Providence*, he advanced the INTERNAL Argument of the OMISSION. By which he proved that an extraordinary Providence was, *in fact*, adminiſtred in the Jewiſh Republic. What change did this make in the ſtate of the caſe? It entirely altered it. *Unbelievers* were now indeed at liberty, and *Believers* too, if ſo perverſely diſpoſed, (which I am ſorry to ſay, they were) to oppoſe, and, as they could, to confute the Argument of the

Divine

Divine Legation: But by no rules of good Logic could they come over again with thoſe ſcripture difficulties to Moſes's credit, which the argument of the *Divine Legation* entirely obviated and continued to exclude, ſo long as that Argument remained unanſwered. For while a demonſtrated truth ſtands good, no difficulties, however inexplicable, have any weight againſt that ſuperior evidence. Not to admit of this fundamental maxim would be to unſettle many a *phyſical* and *mathematical* demonſtration, as well as this *moral* one.

I ſay therefore, as things now ſtand, To oppoſe difficulties againſt the adminiſtration of an *extraordinary Providence*, by reaſonings *a poſteriori*, after that providence has been *proved a priori*, and before the *proof* has been confuted, is the moſt palpable and barefaced impoſition on our underſtanding. In which however, his Lordſhip is but one of a hundred: and indeed, the moſt decent and conſiſtent of the hundred; as his *declared purpoſe* is to deſtroy the credit and authority of the Jewiſh Legiſlator.

We

We will not however decline to examine the weight of theſe Objections, tho' ſo fooliſhly and ſophiſtically urged.

If there was this *extraordinary* Providence adminiſtred, ſays his Lordſhip, *Why ſo many precautions taken? Why was a ſolemn covenant made with God as with a temporal Prince? Why were ſo many promiſes and threatnings of rewards and puniſhments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, moſt pathetically held out by Moſes?*

I will preſume to ſolve this difficulty. We find throughout, what *we* are wont to call, the *Hiſtory of Providence*, but what *his Lordſhip* is pleaſed to intitle, *Tales more extravagant than thoſe of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral Government of the World, always makes uſe of human means, as far as thoſe means will go; and never interpoſes with his *extraordinary* Providence, but when they will go no further. To do otherwiſe, would be to make an unneceſſary waſte of Miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of Nature, by obſcuring the harmony of order, than to manifeſt the

the Lord and Controller of it, by arreſting its delegated Powers. This method in God's moral Government, all our ideas of Wiſdom ſeem to ſupport. Now when He, the great Maſter of the Univerſe, had decreed to rule the Jewiſh People in an extraordinary way, he did not propoſe to ſuperſede any of the meaſures of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be eſteemed a full anſwer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But would you ſee it drawn out more at length, you may conſult the Author's *remarks* on the ſame kind of Sophiſtry employed by Dr. SYKES againſt the *Divine Legation.*

His Lordſhip goes on: *Would there have been any more impropriety in holding out thoſe of one kind than thoſe of another, becauſe the ſupreme Being, who diſpoſed and ordered both, was in a particular manner preſent amongſt them? Would an addition of rewards and puniſhments, more remote, but eternal, and in all reſpects far greater to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of theſe things can be ſaid.*

His Lordſhip totally miſtakes the drift and deſign of the Author's Argument. The *Divine Legation* infers no more from the

the fact of the *omiſſion* than this, That the Jewiſh Oeconomy, adminiſtred by an *extraordinary* providence, could do without the ſervices of the *omitted* Doctrine; not, that that Doctrine, even under ſuch a Diſpenſation, was *of no uſe*, much leſs that it was IMPROPER.

But then one of his Followers, or, what is as good, one of the Adverſaries of the *Divine Legation*, will be ready to ſay, "If a *future ſtate* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *uſe*, under an extraordinary diſpenſation, How came MOSES not to give it?" For great and wiſe ends of Providence, vaſtly countervailing the uſe of that Doctrine, if you will believe the Author of the *Divine Legation:* Who, if he did not impoſe upon us, when he promiſed a *third* volume, (as his Lordſhip conſtantly believed, he did) will there explain thoſe *ends* at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to Him, concerning the REASONS of the *omiſſion*; And previouſly aſſures us, he is *not over ſolicitous about their weight*. This, I ſuppoſe, is to make his *Counters* paſs current: For then, as Hobbes expreſſes it, they become the *money of fools*, when

when we ceaſe to be *ſolicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their *colour*, not their *weight*; their Rhetoric, and not their Logic. But this muſt be ſaid with exception to the firſt, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining.

If (ſays his Lordſhip) *the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul and a future ſtate had been revealed to* MOSES, *that he might teach them to the Iſraelites, he would have taught them moſt certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.* It is in mood and figure, you ſee; and, I warrant you, deſigned to ſupply what was wanting in the *Divine Legation*; tho' as the Author of that book certainly believed, *the doctrines were not revealed*, 'tis ten to one but he thought Moſes not at liberty to teach them: unleſs you can ſuppoſe that his Lordſhip, who believed nothing of revelation, might believe Moſes to be reſtrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of the *Divine Legation*, who held Moſes's pretenſions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his Commiſſion. Thus far, then, theſe two Writers

may be ſaid to agree: But this good underſtanding laſts not long. His Lordſhip's *modeſty* and the others *pertneſs* ſoon make the breach as wide as ever.—*Why they were not ſo revealed* (ſays his Lordſhip) *ſome* PERT DIVINE *or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to gueſs.* The readineſs of the one and the backwardneſs of the other, are equally well ſuited to their reſpective principles. Should his Lordſhip have *gueſſed*, it muſt have brought him to what he moſt dreaded, the divine origin of the Jewiſh Religion: Had his Adverſary forborn to *gueſs*, he had betrayed his cauſe, and left thoſe *data* unemployed, which enabled him, I do not ſay to *gueſs*, but to diſcover, and demonſtrate the *Divine Legation of Moſes.*

However, *This*, his Lordſhip *will preſume to advance, that ſince theſe doctrines were not revealed by God to his ſervant* MOSES, *it is highly probable, that the Legiſlator made a ſcruple of teaching them to the Iſraelites, howſoever well inſtructed he might be in them himſelf, and howſoever uſeful to Government he might think them.* Was ever ſuch galimatias! And all for the miſerable pleaſure of depriving Religion of this

this illuſtrious evidence of its truth. He perſonates, you ſee, a Believer, who holds MOSES to be an inſpired Lawgiver: But how ill does he ſuſtain his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive the LAW from God, or he did not. If he did not, Why are we mocked with the diſtinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *Law* from God, Why are we ſtill worſe mocked with the diſtinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for the *omiſſion of a future ſtate*, as the direction to *inculcate the Unity of the Godhead?* Why was all this mockery, you ſay? For an obvious purpoſe: it was to draw us from the TRUE object of our inquiry, which is, What GOD intended by the *omiſſion*; to that FANTASTIC object, which only reſpects, what MOSES intended by it. For the plain, obvious intention of GOD evinces the truth of *Moſes's miſſion*; but the intention of MOSES, when conſidered in contradiſtinction to God's, terminates in the human views of an ordinary Law-

Lawgiver; which leads us back again to Infidelity.

And now, having ſtript Moſes of his *divine*, and again inveſted him with his *civil* Character; his Lordſhip conſiders, What it was, which, under this character, might induce him to *omit a future ſtate*; and he finds it to be, leſt this doctrine ſhould have proved hurtful to the doctrine of the *Unity*, which it was his purpoſe to inculcate amongſt his People, in oppoſition to the Egyptian *Polytheiſm*.

Moſes, (ſays his Lordſhip) *it is highly probable, made a ſcruple of teaching theſe Doctrines to the Iſraelites, howſoever well inſtructed he might be in them, himſelf, and howſoever uſeful to Government he might think them. The People of Egypt, like all other nations, were Polytheiſts, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward Doctrine: Natural Theology and natural Religion were the inward Doctrine; while Polytheiſm, Idolatry, and* ALL THE MYSTERIES, *all the impieties and follies of magic, were the* OUTWARD *Doctrine. Moſes was initiated into thoſe Myſteries*

Myſteries where the ſecret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded—— For an accurate Divider commend me to his Lordſhip. In diſtinguiſhing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the Myſteries* amongſt the *outward:* tho' if they had an *inward*, it muſt neceſſarily be part of thoſe *Myſteries*. But he makes amends preſently, (tho' his amends to truth is ever at the hazard of a contradiction) and ſays, that *Moſes learnt the inward doctrine in the Myſteries*. Let this paſs. He proceeds — *Moſes had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not ſo the Iſraelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outſide of the Religion of Egypt. And if a future ſtate was known to them, it was known only in the ſuperſtitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumſtances, in which it was dreſſed up and preſented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Iſraelites, without giving them an occaſion the more to recal the Polytheiſtical fables, and practiſe the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their Captivity.* The Children of Iſrael, it ſeems, *knew no more of*

a future ſtate, than by the ſuperſtitious rites and fabulous circumſtances with which it was dreſſed up and preſented to the public belief. What then? MOSES, he owns, *knew more.* And what hindered MOSES from communicating of his knowledge to the People, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new Law and a new Religion? His Lordſhip lets us underſtand, that this People knew as little of the *Unity*; for he tells us, it was amongſt the *inward* Doctrines of the Egyptians: Yet this did not hinder Moſes from inſtructing his people in the doctrine of the *Unity.* Why then ſhould it hinder his teaching them the *inward* doctrine of a *future ſtate*, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances? He had diveſted *Religious worſhip* of the abſurdities of Demi-Gods and Heroes. What ſhould hinder him from diveſting a *future ſtate* of Charon's boat and the Elyſian fields? But the notion of a *future ſtate* would have recalled thoſe fabulous circumſtances which had been long connected with it. And would not *Religious worſhip*, under the idea of a tutelary Deity, and a temporal King, recal the polytheiſm of Egypt? Yet Moſes ventured upon

upon this inconvenience, for the ſake of great advantages. Why ſhould he not venture on the other, for the ſake of greater? For the doctrine of a future ſtate, is, as his Lordſhip confeſſes, even *neceſſary* both to civil and religious Society. But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and ſuperſtitions concerning the ſoul; ſuperſtitions, which, tho' learnt in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of Polytheiſm, when, in other places, he aſſures us, that Moſes indulged the Iſraelites in the moſt characteriſtic ſuperſtitions of Egypt?

However, let us ſee how he ſupports this wiſe obſervation. *Rites and Ceremonies* (ſays his Lordſhip) *are often ſo equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are ſo cloſely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine, is,* IN SOME SORT, *to teach the rites and ceremonies.*

In ſome ſort, is well put in, to ſoften the deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to ſhew, that a ſuperſtitious Rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain Doctrine, will obtrude itſelf whenever that

Doctrine is taught: and his reaſoning is calculated to prove, that where the Rite is practiſed, the Doctrine will ſoon follow. But this does not hold in the reverſe, and the Rite follow the Doctrine; becauſe a Principal may ſtand without its Dependent; but a Dependent can never ſubſiſt without its Principal.

Under cover of theſe groteſque ſhapes, into which his Lordſhip has traveſtied the Jewiſh Lawgiver, he concludes, that MOSES *being* AT LIBERTY *to teach this doctrine of rewards and puniſhments in a future ſtate, or not to teach it, he might very well chuſe the latter* — Yet it was but at the beginning of this paragraph, that he tells us, *Moſes was* NOT AT LIBERTY *to teach, or not to teach.* His Lordſhip's words are theſe, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his ſervant Moſes, it is highly probable that this Legiſlator* MADE A SCRUPLE *of teaching it.* But his Lordſhip knows that Stateſmen ſoon get the better of their *ſcruples:* and then, by another fetch of political caſuiſtry, find themſelves more at liberty than ever.

I had obſerved above, that our noble Diſcourſer, who makes MOSES ſo *ſcrupulous*

that

that he would, on no terms, afford a handle for one ſingle Egyptian ſuperſtition to get footing amongſt his people; has, on other occaſions, charged him with introducing them by wholeſale. He was ſenſible his Inconſiſtency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it.—*Tho' he* [Moſes] *indulged the Iſraelites, on account of the hardneſs of their hearts, and by the divine permiſſion, as it is preſumed, in ſeveral obſervations and cuſtoms, which did not* LEAD *directly, tho' even they did ſo perhaps* IN CONSEQUENCE, *to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of Egypt.* And could teaching the Doctrine of a *future ſtate* poſſibly do any more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE, (as his Lordſhip elegantly expreſſes it) *to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of Egypt*, by drawing after it thoſe *ſuperſtitious Rites and fabulous circumſtances* which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of ſuch a State? If, for the *hardneſs of their hearts*, they were indulged in *ſeveral obſervances and cuſtoms*, which only *led in conſequence* to Polytheiſm and Idolatry, Why, for the *ſame* hardneſs of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a *future ſtate*, which did not

lead, but by a very remote conſequence, to Polytheiſm and Idolatry? Eſpecially ſince this *hardneſs of heart* would leſs bear the denial of a DOCTRINE ſo alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a RITE, to which, habit only and old cuſtom had given a caſual propenſity. Again, thoſe *Rites*, indulged to the People, for the *hardneſs of their hearts*, had in themſelves little uſe, or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewiſh Diſpenſation; but rather retarded them: Whereas a *future ſtate*, by his Lordſhip's own confeſſion, is moſt uſeful to all Religions, and therefore incorporated into all the Syſtems of Paganiſm; and was particularly uſeful to the Iſraelites, who were, he ſays, both a *rebellious* and a *ſuperſtitious* people: diſpoſitions, which not only made it neceſſary to omit nothing that might inforce obedience, but likewiſe facilitated the reception and ſupported the influence of the doctrine in queſtion.

You have here the whole of his Lordſhip's boaſted ſolution of this important Circumſtance of the OMISSION. And you ſee how vainly he ſtrives to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with

the

the weight of ſo irreſiſtible a Power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth, but ſo maimed and broken, that all his remaining ſtrength is in his venom; which he now ſheds in abundance over the whole Moſaic Oeconomy; It is pronounced to be a groſs impoſture; and this very circumſtance of the OMISSION is given as the undoubted proof of his accuſation.

— "Can we be ſurpriſed then (ſays his "Lordſhip) that the Jews aſcribed to the "all perfect Being, on various occaſions, "ſuch a conduct and ſuch Laws as are "inconſiſtent with his moſt obvious per-"fections? Can we believe ſuch a con-"duct and ſuch Laws to have been his, "on the word of the proudeſt and moſt "lying Nation in the world? Many other "conſiderations might have their place "here. But I ſhall confine myſelf to "one; *which I do not remember to have ſeen "nor heard urged on one ſide, nor* ANTI-"CIPATED *on the other.* To ſhew then, "the more evidently, how ABSURD, as "well as IMPIOUS it is to aſcribe theſe "Moſaical Laws to God, let it be conſi-"dered, that NEITHER the people of

" Iſrael, nor their Legiſlator perhaps,
" KNEW ANY THING OF ANOTHER LIFE,
" wherein the crimes committed in this
" life are to be puniſhed. Altho' he
" might have learned this Doctrine, which
" was not ſo much a ſecret doctrine as it
" may be preſumed that the unity of
" the ſupreme God was, amongſt the
" Egyptians. Whether he had learned
" both, or either, or neither of them in
" thoſe ſchools, cannot be determined:
" BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH
" ASSURANCE; If MOSES knew, that
" crimes, and therefore Idolatry, one of
" the greateſt, were to be puniſhed in
" another life, he deceived the people in
" the Covenant they made, by his inter-
" vention, with God. If he did not know
" it, I ſay it with horror, the conſe-
" quence, *according to the hypotheſis I op-*
" *poſe*, muſt be, that God deceived both
" him and them. In either caſe, a co-
" venant or bargain was made, wherein,
" the conditions of obedience and diſobe-
" dience were not fully, nor by conſe-
" quence, fairly ſtated. The Iſraelites
" had better things to hope, and worſe
" to fear, than thoſe which were expreſſed

" in

" in it: and their whole hiſtory ſeems to " ſhew how much need they had of theſe " additional motives to reſtrain them from " Polytheiſm and Idolatry, and to anſwer " the aſſumed Purpoſes of divine Provi- " dence [7]."

This wonderful Argument, his Lordſhip ſays, he does *not remember to have ſeen, or heard urged on one ſide, nor anticipated on the other.* This, You are to underſtand as a kind reproof to the Author of the *Divine Legation:* for none but He, I think, could *anticipate* an objection to an Argument which none but He had employed. Give me leave then to *ſupply* his defects: I am the firſt good natured Animadverter on him that has done ſo; the reſt have contented themſelves with their beſt endeavours to *expoſe* them. However, had the Author of the *Divine Legation* been aware of the Objection, it is ten to one but he had done his beſt to *anticipate* it. But as his Lordſhip is ſo generous to invite an anſwer to it, he ſhall not be diſappointed.

Let it be conſidered (ſays his Lordſhip)

[7] Vol. v. p. 194—5.

that perhaps Moſes KNEW NOTHING *of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be puniſhed.* — *Conſidered* by whom? Not by his Lordſhip, or his kind Readers: for he has brought them to *conſider* the contrary. " Many probable " reaſons (ſays he) might be brought to " ſhew, that this was an Egyptian doctrine " *before the exode*; and this particularly, that " it was propagated from Egypt, ſo ſoon " at leaſt afterwards, *by all thoſe who were* " *inſtructed* LIKE MOSES, in the wiſdom " of that People. He tranſported much of " this wiſdom into the ſcheme of Reli- " gion and Government which he gave " the Iſraelites; and, among other things, " certain Rites, which SEEM TO ALLUDE, " OR HAVE A REMOTE RELATION TO, " THIS DOCTRINE [8]." This poſſibly might have recurred to his Lordſhip, while he was talking of this new and *unanticipated* argument, and therefore, in the tricking it up amongſt his *Fragments*, to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very happy corrective, *altho' Moſes might have learnt this Doctrine, which* WAS NOT SO

[8] Vol. v. p. 238–9.

MUCH

MUCH A SECRET *doctrine, as it may be preſumed that the unity of the ſupreme God was amongſt the Egyptians.* But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have truſted to the rare ſagacity of the Public to find them out. For he had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; thus in the caſe before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here ſpeaking of a *future ſtate*, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances; *Perhaps*, ſays he, MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE. *Which, was* NOT SO MUCH A SECRET *doctrine, as that of the Unity.* Now, Sir, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 239th page, and there you will find, that a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET *Doctrine, as that of the Unity.*—" There is reaſon to believe, " that natural Theology and natural Re- " ligion were INWARD doctrines amongſt " the Egyptians. MOSES might be let " into a knowledge of BOTH by being " initiated into thoſe *Myſteries* where the " *ſecret* doctrine alone was taught. But " we cannot imagine, that the Children of " Iſrael in general enjoyed the ſame pri-

" vilege. No, *they knew nothing more*
" *than the outſide* of the Egyptian Reli-
" gion: and if the *Doctrine we ſpeak of*
" [A FUTURE STATE] was known to
" them, it was known only in the ſuper-
" ſtitious Rites, and with all the fabulous
" circumſtances, in which it was dreſſed
" up and preſented to vulgar belief."—
Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a *future ſtate*, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances, *was as much a ſecret Doctrine as the doctrine of the Unity?*

But his Lordſhip's contradictions are the leaſt of my concern. It is his Argument I have now to do with. And this, he ſays, he *advances* WITH ASSURANCE. I agree with him: It is that which adds a reliſh to all he advances.

He thinks he can reduce thoſe who hold the hypotheſis of no future ſtate in the Jewiſh Oeconomy, to the neceſſity of owning, that MOSES, *or that* GOD *himſelf, acted unfairly by the Iſraelites.* How ſo, You aſk? Becauſe One or Other of them concealed a *future ſtate.* And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of the actual Sanctions of moral conduct, *future puniſhment.* But who told him, that this, which was no ſanction of the *Jewiſh Law,*

Law, was a ſanction to the moral conduct of the *Jewiſh People?* Who, unleſs the *artificial Theologer?* the man he moſt decries and deſpiſes.

In all this ſort of *Theology*, there being nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of *Original Sin*, that gives the leaſt countenance to ſo monſtrous an opinion, every thing in the GOSPEL, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY exclaims againſt it.

JESUS, indeed, to prove that the departed Iſraelites ſtill exiſted, quotes the title God was pleaſed to give himſelf, of *the God of Abraham, Iſaac, and Jacob*; which, together with their *exiſtence*, proves likewiſe the *happineſs* of their condition: for the relation they are ſaid to ſtand in with God, ſhews them to be of his kingdom. But we muſt remember, that the queſtion with his Lordſhip is, not of *reward*, but *puniſhment*. Again, JESUS informs us, in a parable indeed, that the deceaſed *rich man* was *in a place of torment*. But we muſt remember that the ſcene was laid at a time when the Doctrine of a *future ſtate* was become national. To know our bleſſed Maſter's ſentiments on the abſtract queſtion of *ſubjection to an un-*

known Sanction, we may conſider the following words, " The ſervant which knew " his Lord's will, and prepared not himſelf, neither did according to his will, " ſhall be beaten with many ſtripes; but " he that knew not, and did commit things " worthy of ſtripes, ſhall be beaten with " few ſtripes [8]." Now the Will of a Maſter or Sovereign, declared in his Laws, always includes in it, the *Sanctions* of thoſe Laws. The Author of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* expreſly diſtinguiſhes the ſanction of the Jewiſh law from that of the Goſpel; and makes the diſtinction to conſiſt in this, that the one was of *temporal* puniſhments, and the other of *future*. *He that deſpiſed Moſes's Law died without mercy under two or three witneſſes. Of how much ſorer puniſhment, ſuppoſe ye, ſhall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God* [9]? Which appeal is without common ſenſe or honeſty, on ſuppoſition that the apoſtle held the Jews to be ſubject to *future* puniſhments, before that Sanction was promulged unto them. From the GOSPEL therefore, it cannot be inferred, that the Iſraelites, while only following the Law of Moſes, in which the ſanction of a *future ſtate* is

[8] Luke xii. p. 47—8. [9] C. x. ẏ 28—9.

omitted, were liable or ſubject to the puniſhments of that ſtate.

Let us ſee next, Whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or *natural Religion* (as his Lordſhip is pleaſed, for ſome reaſon or other, to diſtinguiſh the terms) hath taught us, that a people, living under an EQUAL PROVIDENCE, or the immediate government of God, to whom he hath given a Law and revealed a Religion, both ſupported by *temporal* ſanctions only, can be deemed ſubject to thoſe *future* puniſhments, unknown to them, which *natural* Religion before, and *Revealed* Religion ſince, have diſcovered to be due to bad men living under an UNEQUAL PROVIDENCE.

NATURAL RELIGION ſtandeth, (as has been already ſhewn) on this Principle, "that the Governor of the Univerſe REWARDS and PUNISHES moral Agents." The length or ſhortneſs of human exiſtence come not primarily into the idea of Religion; not even into that compleat idea of Religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The Religioniſt, ſays he, *muſt believe that God is, and that he* IS A REWARDER *of thoſe who ſeek him.*

While

While God exactly diſtributed his rewards and puniſhments here, the light of Nature directed men to look no further for the Sanctions of his Laws. But when it came to be ſeen, that He was *not always* a rewarder and a puniſher *here*, men neceſſarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be both, *hereafter*; and conſequently, that this life was but a ſmall portion of human duration. They had not yet ſpeculated on the permanent nature of the Soul. And when they did ſo, that conſideration, which, under an *unequal* providence came ſtrongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency, under an *equal* one, to open to them the proſpects of *futurity*: becauſe, tho' they ſaw the Soul unaffected by thoſe cauſes which brought the body to diſſolution, yet they held it to be equally dependent for its exiſtence, on the Creator's Will; who, amongſt the various means of its deſtruction, of which they had no conception, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more for that purpoſe.

Thus a FUTURE STATE was brought, by natural light, into Religion: and from thence-

thenceforth, under this unequal diſtribution of things, became a neceſſary part of Religion. But, in the Jewiſh THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and puniſher, *here*. Natural light therefore ſhewed that, under ſuch an adminiſtration, the ſubjects of it did not become liable to future Puniſhments, till that ſanction was known amongſt them.—And this, which Natural Religion teaches, we may be ſure God, who conſtituted *natural* as well as *revealed* Religion, will confirm.

Thus we learn by the Principles of the *Goſpel*, and of the *Religion of Nature*, that his Lordſhip calumniated both, when he affirmed, that, on the hypotheſis in queſtion, MOSES *Deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: Or that, if Moſes did not know the doctrine of a future ſtate, then* GOD *deceived both him and them.*

Should it now be aſked, how God will deal with wicked men, thus dying under the Moſaic Diſpenſation? give me leave to anſwer, in the words of Dr. CLARKE, to as impertinent a queſtion. He had demonſtrated a ſelf-moving Subſtance to be immaterial, and ſo, not periſhable like

Bodies. This including the Souls of irrational animals, it was aſked "How theſe were to be diſpoſed of, when they had left their reſpective habitations?" To which the Doctor very properly replies, "Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely "wiſe God may, without any great diffi-"culty, be ſuppoſed to have more ways "of diſpoſing of his Creatures [I add, with perfect juſtice and equity, and with equal meaſure, to all] "than we are, at preſent, "let into the ſecret of[1]." But if the Author of the *Divine Legation* has not promiſed more than he can perform (as his long delay gives us too much room to ſuſpect) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his laſt Volume.

Nothing, then, remains of this objection but the ſanction of *future rewards:* And I would by no means deprive the faithful Iſraelites of theſe. So that his Lordſhip has this to make his beſt of. And, in his opinion, even an unexpected *reward,*

[1] Octavo Tracts againſt Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

is

is *unfair* dealing; for he joins it with *puniſhment*, as if his conſequence againſt God's juſtice and goodneſs might be equally deduced from either of them. — *A covenant*, ſays he, *was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and diſobedience were not* FULLY, *nor, by conſequence,* FAIRLY *ſtated. The Iſraelites had* BETTER THINGS TO HOPE, *and worſe to fear than thoſe which were expreſſed in it.* Tho' it be hard on the *Benefactor*, to be denied the liberty of giving more than what, in his Covenant, he had expreſsly promiſed; it is ſtill harder on the Party *obliged*, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this caſe, the *conditions* are not FULLY *ſtated*; and therefore, according to his Lordſhip's Logic, BY CONSEQUENCE, NOT FAIRLY. To ſtrengthen this *Conſequence*, his Lordſhip concludes in theſe words—*And their whole Hiſtory ſeems to ſhew how much need they had of theſe additional motives* [future Rewards and Puniſhments] *to reſtrain them from Polytheiſm and Idolatry, and to anſwer the* ASSUMED *purpoſes of Divine Providence.*

Whoever attentively reflects upon all theſe conceſſions together — That Moſes was

himſelf of the race of Iſrael — was learned in all the wiſdom of Egypt — and capable of freeing his People from their Yoke — that he brought them within ſight of the promiſed Land; a fertile Country, which they were to conquer and inhabit — that he inſtituted a ſyſtem of Laws, which has been the admiration of the wiſeſt men of all ages — that he underſtood the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE: and by his experience gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy of it in general; and by his perfect knowledge of the rebellious and ſuperſtitious temper of his own People, could not but ſee how uſeful it was to them in particular — Whoever, I ſay, reflects on all theſe things (and all theſe things are amongſt his Lordſhip's conceſſions) and at the ſame time conſiders, that MOSES, throughout his whole ſyſtem of Law and Religion, is entirely ſilent concerning a *future ſtate* of Rewards and Puniſhments, will, I believe, conclude, that there was ſomething more in the OMISSION than Lord BOLINGBROKE could fathom, or, at leaſt, was willing to find.

But let us turn from MOSES's conduct, (which will be elſewhere conſidered at large)

large) to his Lordſhip's, which is our preſent buſineſs. Firſt, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *Omiſſion*, excluſively of MOSES's *Divine Legation:* but, as if diſſatisfied with them himſelf (which he well might be, for they deſtroy one another) he next attempts, you ſee, to prove, that the *Legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumſtance of the *omiſſion*. And now at laſt he will demonſtrate that an *extraordinary providence*, in general, ſuch a one as is repreſented by Moſes, and which, the Author of the *Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumſtance of the *omiſſion*, was *actually* adminiſtered in the Jewiſh Republic, could not poſſibly be adminiſtered, without deſtroying free will; without making Virtue ſervile; and without relaxing univerſal benevolence. And, to make all ſure, he ſhuts up the account by ſhewing, that an *extraordinary* providence could anſwer no reaſonable end or purpoſe.

In his *firſt order* of evaſions, he ſeems to be alone; but in the *ſecond* and *third*, he had the pleaſure of ſeeing in coadjutorſhip with him, many an orthodox Writer againſt the *Divine Legation*.

I have conſidered his Lordſhip's *firſt* and *ſecond order*. The *third* remains to be examined: it is the laſt refuge of his infidelity: And then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of the *Divine Legation*, in caſe he chuſes to take him up, in defence of the other principles of his book; all of which, with diſtinguiſhed honour to this Writer above any other, his Lordſhip has attempted, to confute at large.

1. His firſt objection to the adminiſtration of an extraordinary providence, ſuch as MOSES promiſed to his People on the part of GOD, is, that it would DESTROY FREE-WILL. But here let me obſerve, that he affects to diſguiſe the immediate Object of his attack; and, in arguing againſt an extraordinary Providence, chuſes to conſider it in the abſtract, as the Point ariſes out of an imaginary diſpute between Him and the Divines; who, he pretends, are diſſatisfied with the preſent order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquieſcence in God's juſtice, the adminiſtration of an *equal Providence*, *here*. But, this obliquity in diſguiſing the true object of his attack,

attack, not being of itſelf ſufficient to embarras his adverſaries, he further ſupports it by a prevarication: For it is not true, that Divines are diſſatisfied with the preſent order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordſhip for imputing this ſcandal to them, being only this aſſertion, "That if the preſent ſtate be the whole of Man's exiſtence, then the Juſtice of God would have exactly diſpenſed good and evil *here*: but, as he has not ſo diſpenſed them, it follows, that there will be a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments *hereafter*."

This being premiſed, I proceed to his firſt objection: — "In good earneſt (ſays "his Lordſhip) is a ſyſtem of particular "providences, in which the ſupreme Be-"ing, or his Angels, like his Miniſters to "reward, and his Executioners to puniſh, "are conſtantly employed in the affairs "of mankind, much more reaſonable?" [than the *Gods* of EPICURUS or the *morals* of POLEMO] "Would the JUSTICE of "God be more MANIFEST in ſuch a ſtate "of things than in the preſent? I ſee "no room for MERIT on the part of

" Man, nor for JUSTICE on the part of
" God, in ſuch a ſtate [2]."

His Lordſhip aſks, *whether the Juſtice of God would be more manifeſt* in ſuch a ſtate of things, where good is conſtantly diſpenſed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, *than in the preſent*, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordſhip, by *the preſent ſtate of things*, includes the rectification of them in a *future ſtate*, I anſwer, that *the juſtice of God would not be more* manifeſt, but equally and fully manifeſt in both caſes. If his Lordſhip does not include this rectification in a *future ſtate*, then I anſwer his queſtion by another; Would the Juſtice of the Civil Magiſtrate be more manifeſt, where he exactly diſpenſes rewards to good men, and puniſhment to evil, than where he ſuffers the Cunning and the Powerful to carve for themſelves?

But *he ſees no room for merit on the part of Man, or Juſtice on the part of God.* If he does not ſee, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himſelf and his Reader; to the turning his view

[2] Vol. v. p. 425—6.

from

from the Scripture-repreſentation of an equal Providence, to the partialities of Fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit, and to the injuſtices of Calviniſtical election; and to his giving theſe to the reader, in its ſtead. See how dextrouſly he ſlides *Enthuſiaſm* and *Predeſtination* into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal Providence. —*If ſome men were* DETERMINED TO GOODNESS *by the ſecret workings of the Spirit*, &c. Yes indeed, if you will be pleaſed to allow him, that, under an equal providence, the *will is over-ruled*, you muſt be forced to allow him there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this ſubſtituting, what he calls *artificial theology* in the place of *bible-theology*, is his uſual leger-de-main. So again, *I can conceive ſtill leſs, that individual Creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual exiſtence, can be the objects of predilection or averſion, of love or hatred to God.* I believe, every Goſpel-Divine conceives as little of this as himſelf; and as much of the conſequence of ſuch a ſyſtem, *viz.* that it violates *God's juſtice*. But what have theſe human inventions to do with the *extraordinary Providence*, repreſented

in

in holy Writ? To ſay, that this Providence takes away man's merit and God's juſtice, is confounding all our ideas of right and wrong. Is it not the higheſt merit of a rational creature to comply with the ſtrongeſt motive? And is not God's juſtice then moſt manifeſt when the order of things preſent feweſt difficulties and obſcurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordſhip was plainly of theſe ſentiments, when, arguing againſt God's compliance with the Jewiſh *hardneſs of heart*, he thought it more becoming the Maſter of the Univerſe, to bend the perverſe ſtiffneſs of their Wills; and, when, arguing againſt a *future ſtate* from the preſent good order of things, he pretends to ſhew, *againſt Divines and Atheiſts in conjunction*, that there was little or no irregularity in the preſent diſpenſations of Providence; at leaſt, not ſo much as the the World commonly imagined. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a conſciouſneſs that the more exact the preſent adminiſtration of God's providence appeared, the more manifeſt it made his Juſtice? But here his Lordſhip's followers may put in, and ſay, that their

Maſter has in this, done no more, (indeed ſcarce ſo much, at leaſt, not in ſo expreſs terms) than a celebrated Prelate, in one of his *diſcourſes* at the *Temple*; who tells us, "That an immediate and viſible "interpoſition of Providence in Behalf of "the righteous, and for the puniſhment of "the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH "THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, "AND NOT LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR "TRYAL [3]." But they who object this, to us, have not conſidered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well obſerves, *A little experience may convince us, that the ſame thing, at different times, is not the ſame* [4]. Now if *different times* may make ſuch alterations in identity, what muſt *different men* do? The *thing ſaid*, being by all candid interpretation, to be regulated on the *purpoſe of ſaying*.

2. Lord Bolingbroke's ſecond objection againſt an equal Providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE, SERVILE.—"If "the Good, beſides the enjoyment of

[3] Vol. ii. p. 258—9.
[4] *Scripture vindicated from the miſrepreſentations of the Bp. of Bangor*, p. 165.

"all

" all that happineſs which is inſeparable
" from Virtue, were exempted from all
" kinds of evil, and if the wicked, be-
" ſides all thoſe evils which are inſe-
" parable from Vice, and thoſe which
" happen to all men in the ordinary
" courſe of events, were expoſed to
" others that the hand of God inflicted on
" them in an extraordinary manner, ſuch
" Good men would have VERY LITTLE
" MERIT; they would have, while they
" continued to be good, no other merit
" than that of children who are cajoled
" into their duty; or than that of Gally-
" ſlaves who ply at the oar, becauſe
" they hear and ſee and fear the laſh of
" the boat-ſwain [5]."

If the perfection of a rational Creature conſiſts in acting according to reaſon; and if his merit riſes in proportion to his advances in perfection; How can that ſtate which beſt ſecures him from acting irrationally, leſſen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of leſs worth for the moral incapacity of his being unjuſt or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or

[5] Vol. v. p. 428.

leſs

leſs perfect according to the dignity or nature of the Agent: But the queſtion here is not concerning the *perfection*, but the *power* of the motive, in turning action into paſſion; which is the only way whereby it can deſtroy *merit* in its ſubject. Now I hold that this fancy, That motives exterior to the Being on which they work, can turn an Agent to a Patient, is one of the greateſt of Phyſical abſurdities. For while agency remains, merit ſubſiſts: the degrees of which do not depend on the leſs or greater force of the motives, but on the more or leſs reaſon of the choice. In a word, there is no other means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, than by taking away agency, and making man paſſive, or, in other terms, a Machine.

But to ſhew, in a more popular way, the futility of this reaſoning, it will be ſufficient to obſerve, that the objection holds equally againſt all religious Sanctions whatſoever. And ſo indeed it was frankly urged by Lord Shaftſbury; who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to ſervilize Virtue: Without doubt, one ſort, juſt as much as another; a

future

ture ſtate, as well as an *equal Providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would ſeem, that *a future ſtate without an equal providence* (for they are alway to be conſidered ſeparately, as they belong to different ſyſtems) would more ſtrongly incline the Will, than *an equal providence without a future ſtate*; as the difference between *future* and *preſent* good, is infinitely great. But the human mind being ſo conſtituted, that the *diſtance* of a good takes off proportionably from its influence, this will bring the force of the two ſanctions nearer to an equality; which proves thus much, and no more, That the objection to the *merit of Virtue* holds, as we ſaid, againſt all religious ſanctions whatever. In the uſe of which, Lord Shaftſbury was not only more ingenuous, who urged it againſt them *all*, but more conſiſtent, as he urged it on his principle of a perfect *diſintereſtedneſs* in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongſt thoſe who hold, that *ſelf-love* and *ſocial*, tho' coincident, are two eſſential paſſions in the human frame.

" That two conſiſtent motions act the Soul,
" And one regards ITSELF, and one the
" WHOLE.

But

But we might go further, and urge againſt both theſe noble Adverſaries of Religion, that the charge of *making virtue ſervile*, holds againſt all *moral* ſanctions likewiſe, as well as againſt all *religious*; as well againſt that whoſe exiſtence they allow, as againſt thoſe which they would perſuade us to be viſionary; both theſe illuſtrious Patrons of infidelity maintaining, that *God has made the practice of virtue our* INTEREST *as well as duty* [4]. But *intereſt* and *ſervility* is, with theſe generous Spirits, the ſame thing.

His Lordſhip's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

—"But would there not be, at the "ſame time, ſome further defects in this "ſcheme? I think there would. It ſeems "to me, that theſe good men being thus "diſtinguiſhed by particular providences, "in their favour, from the reſt of mankind, might be apt either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GENERAL "BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental "Principle of the Law of Nature, and "that PUBLIC SPIRIT, which is the life

[4] Vol. v. p. 429.

"and

" and ſoul of Society. God has made the
" practice of morality our intereſt, as well
" as our duty. But men who found
" themſelves conſtantly protected from the
" evils that fell on others, might grow
" inſenſibly to think themſelves uncon-
" cerned in the common fate: and if they
" relaxed in their zeal for the Public
" good, they would relax in their virtue;
" for public good is the object of Virtue.
" They might do worſe, ſpiritual pride
" might infect them. They might be-
" come in their own imaginations the little
" Flock, or the choſen Sheep. Others
" have been ſo by the mere force of En-
" thuſiaſm, without any ſuch inducements
" as thoſe which we aſſume, in the ſame
" caſe; and experience has ſhewn, that there
" are no Wolves like theſe Sheep [5]."

The *caſe aſſumed*, to which his Lordſhip objects, and againſt which he pretends to argue, is, that of an *equal Providence which exactly diſtributes good to Virtue, and to Vice, evil.* Now the preſent objection to ſuch a ſtate is, an' pleaſe you, that this *favourable diſtinction* of good, to the virtuous man would be apt to *deſtroy*

[5] Vol. v. p. 429.

his

his general benevolence and public ſpirit. Theſe, in his Lordſhip's account, and ſo in mine too, are the ſublimeſt Virtues; and therefore, it is agreed will be moſt highly rewarded: But the tendency of this *favourable diſtinction,* if you will believe him, may prove *the loſs of general benevolence and public ſpirit.* As much as this ſhocks common ſenſe, his Lordſhip has his reaſons. *God has made the practice of morality our* INTEREST *as well as duty. But men, who find themſelves conſtantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow inſenſibly to think themſelves unconcerned in the common fate.*

God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST *as well as duty.* Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our *intereſt,* under an *equal,* as well as under an *unequal* Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably ſo, in the abſence of thoſe *inequalities* which hinder our ſeeing clearly, and feeling conſtantly, that *the practice of morality is our* INTEREST *as well as duty?*

—*But men, who found themſelves conſtantly protected from the evils that fall on*

others, might grow inſenſibly to think themſelves unconcerned in the COMMON FATE. What are thoſe *evils*, under an *equal* Providence, which *fall on others*, and from which the good man is *protected?* Are they not the puniſhments inflicted on the wicked. And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perſeverance in Virtue? Is it poſſible therefore, he ſhould grow inſenſible to thoſe evils, which his Lordſhip calls the *common fate*, when he ſees his *intereſt*, and his duty ſo cloſely connected, that there is no way to avoid thoſe evils but by perſevering in virtue? But his Lordſhip by calling them the *common fate* detects his prevarication. In this reaſoning againſt an *equal Providence*, he ſlurs in upon us, in its ſtead, a *Providence which only protects good men; or rather, one certain ſpecies of good men; and leaves all other to their* COMMON FATE. But admit it poſſible for the good man to *relax in his benevolence, and to grow inſenſible to the common fate:* there is, in *the ſtate here aſſumed*, a ſpeedy means of bringing him to himſelf; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that fall*

fall on others: for when men *relax in their benevolence*, his Lordſhip tells us, *they relax in their virtue:* and, give me leave to tell his Lordſhip, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to ſpeak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, *ſpiritual pride* (he ſays) *might infect the virtuous, thus protected.* And this he will prove *a fortiori*, from the caſe of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we ſhould ſay, that this very *enthuſiaſtic ſpirit* itſelf, and not the viſions of *Protection* it is apt to raiſe, is the true cauſe of *ſpiritual pride?*

ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the *imagination* has got the better of the *judgment*. In this inverted ſtate of things, *Enthuſiaſm*, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: which, in it's extreme, begets this fancy of our being the peculiar favorites of Heaven. Now, every one ſees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the *cauſe*, and not the *effect* of the diſorder. For what but *ſpiritual pride*, ſpringing

out of preſumptive holineſs, could bring the Fanatic to fancy himſelf exalted above the common condition of the faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him thither, would be greatly inflamed; and this addition would be indeed the *effect* of his diſorder. For, as the real communication of Grace purifies the paſſions, and exalts them into virtues, ſo the ſtrong deluſion of ſuch a ſtate, only renders the paſſions more groſs and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice, that his Lordſhip, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general *benevolence*, ſeems to have had the *Jewiſh People* in his eye; who in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the reſt of mankind: a fact, which tho' it makes nothing for his purpoſe, makes very much for mine, as it furniſhes me with an example to ſupport what is here ſaid of *Fanaticiſm*; an infirmity pretty general amongſt the Jews of thoſe Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence, but not the memory, nor even

the effects of it: Nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceaſed. This filled them with ſpiritual pride, as the elect of God; a diſpoſition which, it is confeſſed, tends naturally to deſtroy or to *relax* general benevolence.

Let us ſee now, on the other hand, the natural conſequences, which the *actual* adminiſtration of an *equal* Providence would have on the human mind. In this caſe, as in the other, a warm temper, whoſe object was Religion, would be obnoxious to the common imbecillity of our nature, and too apt to diſgrace itſelf by *ſpiritual pride:* but as this is one of the vices which an equal Providence is always at hand to puniſh, the cure would be direct and ſpeedy. The recovered Votary we will now ſuppoſe to be received again into the number of the Good; and to find himſelf in the *little flock and choſen ſheep*, as they are nick-named by this noble Writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the ſenſe of this high prerogative of humanity, might revive in a warm temper, the ſtill unmortified ſeeds of *ſpiritual pride.* Admit it might; and ſee

what follows. His *pride* revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for puniſhment is ſtill cloſely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy diſcipline, the neceſſary conſequence of an equal Providence, effectually does its work, it purifies the mind from low and ſelfiſh partialities, and adorns the will with general benevolence, public ſpirit, and love of all its fellow Creatures.

What then could ſupport his Lordſhip in ſo perverſe a judgment concerning the ſtate and condition of good men under an *equal* Providence? That which ſupports all his other inſults on Religion; his ſophiſtical change of the queſtion. He objects to an *equal providence* (which Religioniſts pretend has been adminiſtered during one period of the Diſpenſation of Grace) where good men are conſtantly rewarded, and wicked-men as conſtantly puniſhed; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a *favoured elect*, (which never exiſted but in overheated brains) where reward and puniſhment are diſtributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reproba-

reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of juſtice.

But, now, Sir, keep the queſtion ſteddily in your eye, and his Lordſhip's reaſoning in this paragraph will diſcloſe ſuch a complication of abſurdities as will aſtoniſh you. You will ſee an equal Providence, which, in and thro' the very act of rewarding benevolence, public ſpirit, and humility, becomes inſtrumental in producing, in thoſe ſo rewarded, ſelfiſhneſs, neglect of the public, and ſpiritual pride.

His Lordſhip's laſt objection to an extraordinary Providence is, that it would NOT ANSWER ITS END.

" I will conclude this head (ſays he) " by obſerving, that we have *example* as " well as *reaſon* for us, when we reject " the hypotheſis of particular providences. " God was the king of the Jewiſh Peo- " ple. His preſence reſided amongſt " them, and his juſtice was manifeſted " daily in rewarding and puniſhing by " unequivocal, ſignal, and miraculous in- " terpoſitions of his power. The effect " of all was this, the People rebelled at " one time and repented at another. Par-

" ticular providences, directed by God
" himſelf immediately, upon the ſpot, if
" I may ſay ſo, had particular temporal
" effects only, none general nor laſting:
" and the People were ſo little ſatisfied
" with this ſyſtem of Government, that
" they depoſed the ſupreme Being, and
" inſiſted to have another King, and to
" be governed like their neighbours [6]."

In ſupport of this laſt objection you ſee, his Lordſhip was forced to throw off the maſk, and fairly tell us what he aimed at; that is to ſay, to diſcredit the extraordinary Providence mentioned by Moſes. An *equal* Providence, ſays he, will not anſwer its *end*. What is its end? Here, his prevarications bring us, as uſual, to our diſtinctions.—When this Providence is adminiſtered for the ſake of *Particulars*, its firſt end is to diſcipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: When adminiſtered for the ſake of a *Community*, its firſt end is to ſupport the Inſtitution it had erected.

Now his Lordſhip, proceeding from *reaſon* to *example*, gives us this of the Jewiſh Republic, to prove that an equal or

[6] Vol. v. p. 430.

extra-

extraordinary Providence does not anſwer one or other or both theſe ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that in this very place, where he employs the *example*, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberleſs others of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter.—*How long this Theocracy may be ſaid to have continued* (ſays he) *I am quite unconcerned to know, and ſhould be ſorry to miſpend my time in inquiring.*

The *example* then is only an argument *ad hominem.* But the misfortune is, that no Laws of Logic will admit an argument *ad hominem* on this queſtion, *Of the* EFFECTS *of a* REAL *extraordinary providence*; becauſe the nature of the effects of a REAL providence can never be diſcovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To ſay the truth, his Lordſhip is at preſent out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be *real*, his own repreſentation of the caſe would, on his own principles, have proved it but *pretended.* For 'tis a principle with him, that where the *means* do not produce the *end*, ſuch means (all pretences notwithſtanding) are but human inventions.

It is thus he argues againſt the Divinity of the Chriſtian Religion; which he concludes to be an impoſture for its not having effected that laſting reformation of manners, which he ſuppoſes was its principal aim to accompliſh.

So far as to the CHOICE of his *example*. He manages no better in the APPLICATION of it.

We have diſtinguiſhed, concerning the *ends* of an extraordinary providence. Let us ſuppoſe now, that his Lordſhip takes the principal end of the Jewiſh Theocracy to be the reformation of *Particulars*. He refers to their hiſtory, and pretends to ſhew they were not reformed. Now whatever other conſequences may attend this ſuppoſed Fact, the moſt obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordſhip, in proceeding from *reaſon* to *example*, has given us ſuch an *example*, as overturns and wipes out his *reaſoning*. According to his *reaſoning*, an extraordinary providence would tye virtue and good manners ſo faſt down upon every Individual, that his very *Will* would be forced, and the *merit* of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, abſolutely deſtroyed. You would now perhaps

expect his *example* ſhould confirm his fact? Juſt otherwiſe. His example ſhews, his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordſhip's bad reaſoning. For, when we ſee it ſo conſtantly oppoſed to *truth*, it is far from being an additional diſcredit to it, that it is as conſtantly oppoſed to *himſelf*.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOCRACY, was the keeping that People a ſeparate nation, under their own Law and Religion, till the coming of the MESSIAH; and to prepare for his reception by preſerving amongſt them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether the *Theocracy* or extraordinary Providence compaſſed its *end*, we have only to conſider, Whether this people, to the coming of Chriſt, did continue a diſtinct Nation ſeparated from all the other tribes of Mankind, and diſtinguiſhed from them by the worſhip of the true God only. And on inquiry, we ſhall find, they not only did continue thus diſtinct and diſtinguiſhed, but have ſo continued ever ſince. A ſingularity

gularity which has had no *example* amongſt any other People: And is ſufficient to convince us, that there muſt have been ſome amazing power in that *Theocracy*, which could go on operating for ſo many ages after the extraordinary adminiſtration of it had ceaſed. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge againſt the *due efficacy* of this extraordinary providence, but that, *the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects*, is the moſt ample confeſſion of his defeat. And ſo much, for his Lordſhip's exploits in ANTIENT POLITICS.

Let us now come a little nearer to him, and conſider him in his talents for the MODERN.

Here his Lordſhip ſhines without a Rival.

" Whether to *ſettle peace* or to *unfold*
" The drift of hollow ſtates—beſides to know
" Both SPIRITUAL POWER AND CIVIL, what
" each means,
" What ſevers each,"——

as

as a Poet of the laſt age writes of *his* political Friend; who if he did not employ his talents more happily to himſelf or his Country, had much more to anſwer for, as they were vaſtly ſuperior to our turbulent Gentleman's.

However, with the beſt he has, he proceeds to overturn the PRINCIPLES of the ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But the pains he had taken, and the oppoſition he had found from the ARGUMENT of the DIVINE LEGATION, had, by the time he came upon this ſecond Adventure, ſo ruffled his manners and diſcompoſed his temper, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language not only againſt the Syſtem, but even againſt the perſon of the Author.

To underſtand the nature of his Lordſhip's provocation, if at leaſt it aroſe from this treatiſe of the *Alliance*, it may not be improper to ſay a word or two of the occaſion of that Book, and of the Principles on which it is compoſed.

After the many violent convulſions our Country had ſuffered ſince the *Reformation*, by the rage of religious Parties (in which, at one time, liberty of Conſcience was oppreſſed; and at another, the eſtabliſhed Church ruined and overthrown) it pleaſed divine Providence to ſettle our religious Rights on ſuch

principles of juſtice and equity, and to ſecure the civil peace on ſuch maxims of wiſdom and true policy, as moſt effectually guarded both againſt the return of their reſpective violations: and the means employed by this all wiſe providence was the giving, on proper terms of ſecurity to the national Religion, a free toleration to all who diſſented from the eſtabliſhed Worſhip. This ſeemed to be going as far towards perfection, in religious Communion, as the long diſtracted ſtate of the chriſtian Church would ſuffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in poſſeſſion of this bleſſing before they grew weary of it, and ſet on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old diſorders. For it is to be obſerved with ſorrow, that this reform of the Engliſh Conſtitution happened not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of Truth, and carried on upon the principles of Charity: but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE, at one time, vainly perhaps, anxious for the eſtabliſhed Religion [a]; at another, wiſely provident for the ſupport of civil Liberty [b]. So that when ſucceeding diſſentions in Church and State had made this newly reformed Conſtitution the ſubject of enquiry,

[a] *Ch.* II. [b] *Will.* III.

the

the Parties who managed the debate, being thoſe who before, had both perſecuted and ſuffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the diſcuſſion of the right, were not ſuch perhaps as were beſt fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their deciſions. *One* Party ſeemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itſelf, and only a temporary expedient to prevent worſe; while their conduct ſhewed they lay atwatch for the firſt occaſion to break in upon it. This was enough to miſlead the *Other* to conſider the TEST LAW, which covered and ſecured the eſtabliſhed Religion, as no better than a new ſpecies of perſecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this ſhadow of a grievance: to have divine Worſhip really free, they held, that no religious profeſſion ſhould be attended with civil incapacities: a TEST had made that diſtinction amongſt God's Worſhipers; it was therefore to be ſet aſide. But every man ſaw (and perhaps the enemies of the *Teſt* were not amongſt the laſt who ſaw it) that to ſet aſide *this Law*, which, under a general *Toleration* was the only ſecurity of the

eſtabliſhed Church, was expoſing the National worſhip, to all the inroads of a ſectarian rabble. This miſchievous project, ariſing out of abuſed liberty, was at firſt entertained, as we may well ſuppoſe, by the tolerated Churches only. Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of fear, on the diſcovery of that bigotted principle in their Adverſaries, which conſidered *Toleration* as only a temporary expedient: And where was the wonder if thoſe who believed, they had no ſecurity for what they had got, while ſuch principles prevailed, ſhould endeavour to put it out of the power of their adverſaries to diſturb them? Others of a more politic turn cheriſhed it from views of ambition, and in hopes of ſharing the emoluments of the eſtabliſhed Church. It was ſome time before any Member of the Church of England joined with Diſſenters in their clamours againſt a *Teſt Law*, or, more properly ſpeaking, againſt their own *Eſtabliſhment*. This monſtrous coalition did not happen till a warm diſpute on certain metaphyſical queſtions, either too ſublime to become the ſubject of human wit, or too trifling to gain the attention of reaſonable men,

men, had ſtarted new ſcruples concerning Church Subſcription. And to get rid of this neceſſary engagement to *peace*, and acquieſcence in the eſtabliſhed Religion, theſe wiſe and faithful Miniſters of the National Worſhip were amongſt the foremoſt, to lend a hand to it's deſtruction, and the buſieſt to trample down all its fences and ſecurities.

BIGOTRY, you ſee, was at the bottom of the firſt ſet of principles; and *Fanaticiſm*, of the other. In their ſeparate appeals to the experience of Mankind, there was this remarkable difference; All ages had felt the miſchiefs of religious reſtraint and perſecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Chriſtian times, of the evils attending the WANT *of an eſtabliſhed Religion*. The *Fanatics* therefore, were perpetually urging their experience againſt perſecution, ſecure in not having the argument retorted upon them. But, in this imaginary advantage they deceived themſelves; and the very *want* of examples was the greateſt Advantage the *Bigots* had over them. It is true, (theſe might reply,) we have no inſtance of the evils attending the *want* of an eſtabliſhed

Religion. But the reaſon is, becauſe no nation was ever without one: The neceſſity of it, for the ſupport of Society, being ſo indiſpenſable, that Men even in the wildeſt times, who hated religious Eſtabliſhments moſt, and who had been ſworn and *leagued* together for their deſtruction, had no ſooner the power to effect it, by the ſuperiority of their arms, than they found, in ſettling the State, a neceſſity of ſupporting an eſtabliſhed Church. Of which, we have a remarkable example in the INDEPENDENT *Republic*, and the *Protectorſhip* of OLIVER; both of whom, under their ſeveral Uſurpations, were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the Religion they moſt hated, into the NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed, the diſtempers of the State, ſtill further contributed to inflame thoſe of the Church; and, on the Acceſſion of the preſent Line to the Throne, occaſioned a long, a famous, and a regular diſpute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the *two Societies*. But as the ſeveral diſputants had reciprocally given too much and too little both to Church and State; and had bottomed their reaſon-

reaſonings on one common fallacy; the defenders of a TEST, ſupported it on ſuch reaſoning as deſtroyed a Toleration; and the Defenders of religious Liberty, argued againſt the juſtice and equity of that ſecurity, on ſuch principles as concluded equally againſt a national Church.

In this embroiled condition, the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State* found the ſentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and eſtabliſhments, when he propoſed his *Theory* to their conſideration: a Theory calculated to vindicate our preſent happy Conſtitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, By adjuſting the preciſe bounds of the two Societies; by ſhewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their Union: and from thence, by natural and neceſſary conſequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, ſecured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who diſſented from the National Worſhip.

He firſt ſhewed the uſe of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all Ages: He inquired from whence the

uſe ariſes, and found it to be from certain eſſential defects in the very nature and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the Nature of Religion; and ſhewed how, and for what cauſes, it conſtituted a Society: And then, from the Natures of the *two Societies*, he collected, that the object of the Civil, is only the *body* and its intereſts; and the object of the Religious, only the *Soul*. Hence he concluded, that they are both ſovereign, and independent; becauſe they ariſe not out of one another; and becauſe, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to claſh: the ſame-neſs of *original*, or *adminiſtration*, being the only cauſes which can bring one, of two different Societies, into natural ſubjection to the other.

To apply Religion therefore, to the ſervice of Civil Society in the beſt manner it is capable of being applied, he ſhewed it was neceſſary that the *two Societies* ſhould be *united:* For each being ſovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying that Aſſiſtance, in any ſolid or effectual manner. But no ſuch union could ariſe but from *free compact* and convention.

And free convention is never likely to happen, unleſs each Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the *two Societies*, explained what thoſe motives and advantages were. The reſult of which was, that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the *two Societies*, thus united, with the Civil Magiſtrate at their head, appeared to be thoſe very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find eſtabliſhed and enjoyed under our preſent happy Conſtitution in Church and State; which hath perfectly reconciled an ESTABLISHED CHURCH with a free TOLERATION, by the medium of a TEST LAW: This Law therefore the Author in the laſt place, proceeded to vindicate, on the ſame general principles of the Law of nature and nations.

You have here, Sir, a true, tho' ſhort, Analyſis of the *Alliance between Church and State*; with the principles on which the Theory is conducted.

Let us now examine the account his Lordſhip has been pleaſed to give of it. I ſhall take him paragraph by paragraph, in

his native diſorder, as he lies: And for the ſame reaſon, that I followed a different method in confuting his Arguments againſt the *moral attributes*, which I thought fit to methodize and digeſt. For when a diſorderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him ſtill clearer, and ſhew his arguments to more advantage, by reducing them into form. But when he is above meaſure cloudy and confuſed, as here in reaſoning againſt the book of the *Alliance*, the like Aſſiſtance would be ſuſpicious: for the cloud being immoveable, the Reader might come to fancy that both the *obſcurity*, and the *order* were of the anſwerer's making. Therefore the ſafeſt, as well as faireſt way, in this caſe, is to tranſcribe the Writer as he lies, and anſwer him as he riſes. The obſcurities in thought and expreſſion, will be then found his own; and nothing can be objected to his adverſary, but a few repetitions, which in this method of anſwering could not be avoided.

His Lordſhip preludes his attack upon the Book, and the Author, with this curious Narrative.

" I have heard of a Sermon preached " by one Doctor SENIOR, a Fellow of " Trinity

" Trinity College, in Cambridge, before
" King Charles the Second at New-mar-
" ket, *in the days of paſſive obedience and*
" *non-reſiſtance*, and afterwards printed.
" His text was taken from the 14, 15,
" and 16 verſes of the ivth Ch. of Exodus,
" or ſome of them; wherein God directs
" MOSES to take AARON the Levite, be-
" cauſe he knew that AARON could ſpeak
" well to the People, and joins them to-
" gether in Commiſſion, that they might
" aſſiſt one another mutually; that AA-
" RON might be inſtead of a mouth to
" MOSES, and that MOSES might be in-
" ſtead of God to AARON. What other
" applications the good Doctor made of
" theſe texts, I know not. But I am in-
" formed by Mr. LEWIS, who has read
" the Sermon, that he eſtabliſhed on
" them a ſuppoſed *Alliance between the*
" *Church and the State:* or rather between
" the Church and the King. By this *Al-*
" *liance* the well-ſpoken Levite was to in-
" ſtil paſſive obedience to the King, in
" the minds of the People, and to inſiſt
" on it, as on a Law of God: The King,
" on the other hand, was to be the nur-
" ſing Father of the Church, to ſupport

" her Authority, to preſerve, at leaſt, if
" not increaſe, her immunities, and to
" keep her in the full poſſeſſion of all the
" advantages ſhe claimed. The Church
" performed her part, and had a right, by
" virtue of this alliance, if the King did
" not perform his, to teach this doctrine
" no longer, and to reſume her independency
" on the State and on him. This was the
" purport of the ſermon, at leaſt: and WAR-
" BURTON took his hint, POSSIBLY, from
" it, and turned it to ſerve his purpoſe; that
" is, to lay down the ſame principles and
" TO BANTER MANKIND IF HE COULD,
" by NOT drawing directly, and avowedly,
" from them the ſame concluſion. Dr.
" SENIOR's authority is, no doubt, as
" good in this caſe, as that of DE MARCA
" or even of BOSSUET. The firſt, a time-
" ſerving Prieſt, intereſted, and a great
" flatterer, if ever there was one, and
" who made no ſcruple to explain away
" whatſoever he had found himſelf obliged
" to ſay in favour of the State. The latter
" was as wiſe, if not as cunning, as learn-
" ed, and a much better man, tho' not ſo
" much in the favour of Mr. WARBUR-
" TON, who gave them Characters in his

" aſſuming

" aſſuming ſtyle, without knowing any " thing of them; and who has the *imper-* " *tinence to pronounce* of the greateſt Scho- " lar, the greateſt Divine, and the great- " eſt Orator of his age, that *he was a* " *good ſenſible Man.* He was all I have " ſaid of him: but he was an Eccleſiaſtic, " and a ſubject of France [1]."

As to his Lordſhip's account of this Dr. SENIOR, I ſcarce know what credit it deſerves: For he who will falſify a Book in every body's hands, will hardly be very ſcrupulous of what he ſays about a Sermon, which nobody has heard of, but his Friend Mr. LEWIS. At leaſt if Doctor SENIOR was ever a man exiſting in this world, I ſhould fancy he muſt be later than where his Lordſhip, who is no great Chronologer, has thought fit to place him. He tells us it was *in the days of paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance*, and that the doctrine of his ſermon was calculated for the ſervice of popery and arbitrary power. May we not ſuppoſe then, that he flouriſhed under his Lordſhip's *Auſpices*, when the Church was laſt in danger? If this were the caſe, his Lordſhip uſes Dr. SENIOR juſt as he uſed St.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 515.

PAUL,

PAUL [2], firſt ſets him upon preaching *paſſive Obedience*, and then abuſes him for his pains.

But let Dr. SENIOR live when and where he would, his Lordſhip thinks 'tis POSSIBLE that WARBURTON *might have taken the hint of the Alliance from him.* Yes, juſt as *poſſible* as that LOCKE took the hint of the *original compact* from FILMAR.

He aſſures us, however, that *the Authority of Dr.* SENIOR *is as good as that of* DE MARCA, *or even of* BOSSUET. The authority of Dr. SENIOR! For what?— To ſupport Mr. WARBURTON's *doctrine of the Alliance.* But where is it to be had! Of Lord BOLINGBROKE, or Mr. LEWIS? Suppoſe this difficulty to be got over; and Dr. SENIOR as ready at hand as DE MARCA or BOSSUET; yet the Author of the *Alliance*, perhaps, would not think it altogether ſo fit for his purpoſe: For he tells us, that his purpoſe in ſo frequently quoting the acknowledgments of DE MARCA and BOSSUET, in

[2] "By this *Alliance* of the hierarchy and the "Monarchy, Religion that ſhould ſupport good go- "vernment alone, was employed to ſupport good "and bad government alike, AS IT HAS BEEN BY ST. "PAUL." Vol. iv. p. 516.

favour

favour of the State againſt the incroachments of the Church, was to ſhame thoſe *Proteſtant* Divines who had contended for the *independency* of the Church, when eſtabliſhed; and even for its *ſuperiority* before.

But, of theſe two famous Frenchmen, *The firſt* (he ſays) *was a time-ſerving Prieſt, intereſted, and a great flatterer—the latter was as wiſe if not as cunning, as learned and a much better Man, tho' not ſo much in the favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them Characters, in his aſſuming ſtyle, without knowing any thing of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greateſt Scholar, the greateſt Divine, and the greateſt Orator of his age, that* HE WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN.

The Author of the *Alliance*, in the *Advertiſement* to the laſt Edition of his Book, ſpeaking of the French Tranſlator, has theſe words—"He ſupported them "[the concluſions] all along with quota-"tions from the two famous works of "DE MARCA and BOSSUET; the one the "wiſeſt, and the other the MOST SENSIBLE "DIVINE THAT NATION EVER PRODU-"CED [3]."

[3] P. 13.

From

From theſe words, I leave you, Sir, to reflect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble Writer's repreſentation, that BOSSUET is *not ſo much in Mr. Warburton's favour* as DE MARCA; and that Mr. Warburton has *the impertinence to pronounce* that BOSSUET was A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN. In the heavy diſtreſſes of Controverſy, many a Writer has been found to miſrepreſent. But to do this out of mere wantonneſs and gayety of heart, and then, on the credit of his miſquotations, to abuſe and call names, is altogether in his Lordſhip's manner.

But you will ſay, perhaps, that the IMPERTINENCE was not in the *familiarity* of the commendation, but in the *choice* of the topic. It may be ſo; and then we get another Rule of good writing from his Lordſhip, who has already furniſhed us with ſo many: "That when the *authority* of an Author is urged in a point concerning Civil and Religious Rights, his *learning*, his *divinity*, and, above all, his *eloquence* ſhould be inſiſted on, rather than his GOOD SENSE."

All this is but a prelude to the Combat. "The notion (ſays this great "Politician) of a FORMAL ALLIANCE "between

" between Church and State, as between " two independent, diſtinct powers, is a " very groundleſs and WHIMSICAL no- " tion. But a fraudulent or ſilent com- " pact between princes and prieſts became " very real, as ſoon as an eccleſiaſtical " order was eſtabliſhed [4]." The latter part of this period is but too true; and the Theory of the *Alliance*, (miſrepreſented in the former part,) was propoſed to remedy theſe miſchiefs. It is this Theory only, which I ſhall undertake to vindicate againſt his Lordſhip's Objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what ſhould he mean elſe) one actually executed in form; and ſuppoſes that the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State*, aſſerted the actual execution of ſuch a one, we may, with more juſtice perhaps, apply to his Lordſhip what he ſays of the Author, concerning DE MARCA and BOSSUET, *That he gives a Character of the book called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it.* Give me leave to quote the Author's own words — " From all this " it appears, that our plan of Alliance is " no precarious arbitrary Hypotheſis, but

[4] Vol. iv. p. 515—16.

" a The-

" a Theory founded in reaſon, and the
" invariable nature of things. For having
" from the eſſence collected the *neceſſity*
" of allying, and the *freedom* of the com-
" pact; we have from the ſame *neceſſity*,
" fairly introduced it; and from its *free-*
" *dom*, conſequentially eſtabliſhed every
" mutual term and condition of it. So
" that now if the reader ſhould aſk, where
" this Charter or treaty of convention for
" the union of the two Societies, on the
" terms here delivered, is to be met with?
" we are enabled to anſwer him. We
" ſay, it may be found in the ſame Ar-
" chive with the famous ORIGINAL COM-
" PACT between Magiſtrate and People;
" ſo much inſiſted on, in vindication of
" the common rights of Subjects. Now
" when a ſight of this *compact* is required
" of the Defenders of Civil liberty, they
" hold it ſufficient to ſay, that it is enough
" for all the purpoſes of fact and right,
" that ſuch original compact is the only
" legitimate foundation of Civil Society:
" That if there were NO SUCH THING
" FORMALLY executed, there was, *vir-*
" *tually*: That all differences between
" Magiſtrate and People ought to be re-

" gulated on the ſuppoſition of ſuch a " Compact; and all Government reduced " to the principles therein laid down; " for that the happineſs of which Civil " Society is productive, can only be at- " tained by it, when formed on thoſe " principles. Now ſomething like this " we ſay of our *Alliance between Church* " *and State* [5]."

Let this ſerve too, for an anſwer to his Lordſhip's inſulting queſtion in another place — " But where ſhall we look for the " conditions of that *original contract which* " *was made between the religious and the ci-* " *vil Society*, I know not; unleſs we ſup- " poſe them written on the back of Con- " ſtantine's grant to Sylveſter [6]." Does his Lordſhip know where to look for the *original contract which was made between the prince and people*, in any place of eaſier acceſs? Or will he, when at a loſs, ſend us to the *back of Conſtantine's grant to Sylveſter*, for this contract likewiſe? But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverſe uſe of words, his Lordſhip means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* be-

[5] Alliance, third Edition, p. 165—6—7.
[6] Vol. iv. p. 419.

tween

tween King and People, This indeed, the Author of the *Alliance* does venture to ſay; and not only to ſay, but to prove likewiſe.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordſhip's opinion, ſtands upon a WHIMSICAL principle: ſo did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moſes, from the Omiſſion of a future State. Indeed his Lordſhip ſeems to have been as much diſtreſſed by WHIMSICAL *Divines*, when he wrote his *eſſays*, as he was by WHIMSICAL *Politicians*, when he wrote his Letter to Sir *W. Windham*. However, the *whimſical* principle, in queſtion is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

This principle, his Lordſhip denies. And it muſt be confeſſed, not, as is his wont, altogether abſurdly: For he who makes Religion itſelf a Fantom, can have but a ſlender idea how it ſhould become embodied.

" Neither NATURE nor REASON (ſays " his Lordſhip) could ever lead men to " imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDE- " PENDENT SOCIETIES IN THE SAME " SOCIETY.

" SOCIETY. This imagination was broach-
" ed by eccleſiaſtical ambition [7]."

A grave ſentence, which to me ſeems equivalent to this, That *neither nature nor reaſon could ever lead men to imagine that* ONE *was* TWO. In this, I readily agree with his Lordſhip. But then the difficulty remains, how ſuch a thing could ever come to be *broached*, (as his Lordſhip ſays it was) by any *imagination* not more diſordered, than it uſually is, by *Eccleſiaſtical Ambition*. School-Learning, indeed, might do much; for there, his Lordſhip has fixed his theological-Bedlam: But *Church Ambition*, he aſſures us, is of another mold; which, as it never failed to *aim at*, ſo, he aſſures us, it never failed to *obtain*, *immoderate Wealth and exorbitant Power*. What then are we to think? That his Lordſhip meant, that *neither Nature nor Reaſon could ever lead men to imagine two diſtinct and independent Societies in the ſame* COMMUNITY? for *Community* being the genus, ſeveral Societies, as the ſpecies, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, merely for my own eaſe, I am ready to ſuppoſe, be-

[7] Vol. iv. p. 412.

cauſe when his Lordſhip is well underſtood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph then are contained theſe two propoſitions:

1. That the Church does not compoſe a *Society*.

2. That it does not compoſe a Society *independent and ſovereign*.

Let us examine his reaſoning on theſe points as it lies in his works; for as diſorderly as it lies, it is meant, I will aſſure you, to overturn the whole Theory of the *Alliance*.

" A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (ſays his " Lordſhip) BY WHICH IS MEANT, ON " THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY, is, or is " not, a creature of the State. *If the firſt*, " it follows, that this order no more than " others, which the State has inſtituted for " the maintenance of good government, " can aſſume any rights, or exerciſe any " powers, except ſuch as the State has " thought fit to attribute to it, and that " the State may, and ought to keep a " conſtant controul over it, not only to pre- " vent uſurpations and abuſes, but to di- " rect the public and private influence of " the Clergy, in a ſtrict conformity to the " letter and ſpirit of the Conſtitution; the

" ſervants

" ſervants of which, in a much truer " ſenſe, they are, than what they affect " ſometimes to call themſelves, the Am- " baſſadors of God to other men. *If the* " *laſt* is ſaid, if it be aſſerted, that the " Church is in any ſort independent on the " State, there ariſes from this pretenſion " the greateſt abſurdity imaginable, that, " I mean, of Imperium in Imperio; an " Empire of divine, in an Empire of hu- " man inſtitution [8]."

Thus far his Lordſhip, who is here reaſoning againſt the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his Argument with telling the Reader, that the Author of that Book has defined a *religious Society*, to be the *body of the Clergy*. —*A religious Society*, *by which* (ſays he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, *is, or is not, a Creature of the State* [9].

You cannot, I believe, ſee this aſſertion without ſome ſurprize, when you obſerve, that the Author of the *Alliance* has defined a *religious Society* to be A NUMBER OF RE-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 413.

[9] So again, *This order of men which we* CALL *the Religious ſociety*,—V. iv. p. 440. And again,—*The Religious Society, as we have accuſtomed ourſelves to* CALL *the Clergy*. V. iv. p. 561.

LIGIOUS CREATURES ASSOCIATED [9]. — When you obſerve, that He makes it one of the principal cares of a *religious Society*, to provide an *order of men*, to be ſet apart for miniſtring in holy things, or in other words, a CLERGY. — "The "greateſt care is to be had, that the acts "of religious worſhip be preſerved ſimple, "decent, and ſignificative. But this can "be done only by providing perſons ſet "apart for this office; whoſe peculiar "employment it ſhall be to preſide in, di- "rect, and ſuperintend the Acts and Ser- "vices of Religion, *&c.* [10]" — When you obſerve, he makes the *end* of religious Society to be, *ſalvation of Souls*, and one of the *means*, the *order* of the *Clergy*. —Laſtly when you obſerve, he oppoſes the *Church* and the *Clergy* to each other. It "is unjuſt in the CHURCH to aim at the "Propagation of Religion by force, and "impertinent to aim at riches, honours, "and powers. But what motives the "CLERGY OF A CHURCH might have, "is nothing to the purpoſe of our in- "quiry. We have only to conſider "what the CHURCH had, WHICH, as "a religious Society, conſiſts of the whole

[9] *Alliance*, p. 55. [10] *Alliance*, p. 61.

"body

" body of the Community, BOTH LAITY " AND CLERGY [1]."

In a word, the Author of the *Alliance*, was at much pains to prove that a *religious Society* or *Church*, does *not mean* the *Clergy*, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reaſons, for the ſake of truth in general, and of his own ſyſtem in particular.

1. It ſhocks common Senſe to call one order or rank in Society, by the name of the Society: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a Subſtance, by the name of the Subſtance.

2. It ſubverted the Theory of the *Alliance* to make the *Clergy*, the *Church*: for then the Church could neither be a diſtinct Society, nor independent; both of which it muſt be, to make it capable of an *Alliance* with the State. It could not be a diſtinct Society; for an *order* of men, as I obſerved juſt be-

[1] *Alliance*, p. 112. The very popiſh Clergy, nay even that *time-ſerving prieſt*, *and great Flatterer*, DE MARCA, were more honeſt than his Lordſhip repreſents the Engliſh Clergy, as he might have ſeen by the quotation at the bottom of this very page of the *Alliance* — ECCLESIÆ CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OMNIUM COMPAGE CONSTITUITUR.

fore, is the ſame in politics, as a quality in phyſics; the one muſt inhere in a *Society*, the other in a *Subſtance:* and theſe being the ſubſtrata of the other, to talk of the independent exiſtence of an *order*, or of a *quality*, is the profoundeſt nonſenſe in Politics and Phyſics. But admitting, that ſuch a Church, which like *Trinculo's* kingdom, conſiſts only of *Viceroys, and Viceroys over them*, was capable of allying with the State, the Author has ſhewn, in the place quoted above, that its motives for *Alliance* would be ſuch as the State could not comply with, either in juſtice or policy.

But extreme neceſſity forced his Lordſhip upon this bold and violent falſification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He ſaw no other way of ſuppreſſing the opinion of an *independent religious Society*, than by ſhewing it to be an *Imperium in Imperio, an Empire of divine, in an Empire of human Inſtitution*; a miſchief, againſt which the State is always on its guard. And if a religious Society ſignified the Church, and the Church, only the *Clergy*, the claim to independency would imply ſuch an *Imperium*. But the Author of the *Alliance* goes upon another principle; he holds that the

Church ſignifies the whole body of the faithful; that though this Society be independent, yet, from this independency, no ſuch ſoleciſm in Politics can ariſe as an *Imperium in Imperio*. This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large, the noble perſon miſrepreſents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

" An Imperium in Imperio (ſays his " Lordſhip) is in truth ſo expreſly con- " tained in the very terms of the aſſertion, " that none of THE TEDIOUS SOPHISTI- " CAL REASONINGS, which have been em- " ployed for the purpoſe, can evade or " diſguiſe it. One of theſe I will mention, " becauſe it has a CERTAIN AIR OF PLAU- " SIBILITY, that impoſes on many; and " becauſe, if it cannot ſtand a ſhort and fair " examination, as I think it cannot, the " whole edifice of eccleſiaſtical *independency* " *and grandeur*, falls to the ground. It has " been ſaid then, that religious and civil " ſocieties are widely diſtinguiſhed by the " diſtinct ends of their inſtitutions, which " imply neceſſarily diſtinct powers and " a mutual independency; that the end of " the one, is the Salvation of Souls, and

" that of the other the ſecurity of tempo-
" ral intereſts; that the ſtate puniſhes
" overt acts, and can puniſh nothing elſe,
" becauſe it can have cognizance of no-
" thing that paſſes in the mind, and does
" not break out into criminal actions; but
" that the Church employing her influ-
" ence to temper the paſſions, to regulate
" the inward diſpoſitions, and to prevent
" ſins, as well as crimes, is that tribunal
" at which even intentions are to be tried,
" and ſins, that do not ripen into crimes,
" nor immediately affect civil Society, are
" to be puniſhed [2]."

This, I will ſuppoſe, his Lordſhip intended as a fair repreſentation of the Author's argument for the *independency* of the Church. Now the Argument, as it ſtands in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different *powers*, belonging to the two Societies, as thoſe *powers* are deduced from their different *ends*. But different powers implying different adminiſtrations, create mutual independency; and different adminiſtrations implying an incapacity of their claſhing with one another, ſhew plainly that ſuch an independency can never produce an *Im-*

[2] Vol. iv. p. 413—14.

perium

perium in Imperio. This is the natural order of the argument. Let us ſee how his Lordſhip repreſents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of Souls,* and *Security of temporal intereſts:* But proceeding to ſpeak of the different *powers,* adapted to thoſe different *ends, viz. coercion* in the ſtate, and *perſuaſion* only in the Church (from whence ariſes a mutual independency) he miſtakes the *conſequences* of theſe powers, which are *puniſhment of overt acts,* and *ſubdual of the paſſions,* for the *powers themſelves*; from which conſequences indeed no independency enſues; becauſe *ſubdual of the paſſions* may, in his Lordſhip's opinion at leaſt, be atchieved by coercive power, as well as *puniſhment of overt acts.* And if both Societies have *coercive power,* one muſt needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this miſtake only to ſhew you, what an imperfect and obſcure conception, his Lordſhip had of the Argument of the *Alliance.* Had he told us, tho' in fewer words, that the Author's reaſoning againſt the pretended *Imperium in Imperio,* ariſing out of a mutual independency, was this, That the State having coercive power, and the Church having

having none, the adminiſtration of the two Societies could never claſh; that oppoſition being the only circumſtance which makes the miſchief of an *Imperium in Imperio*; Had he told us this, I ſay, we ſhould have ſeen, that at leaſt he *underſtood* his Adverſary.

But let us conſider how he goes about to anſwer what he ſo ill repreſents.

" Now in anſwer to all this (ſays his " Lordſhip) WE MAY DENY, with truth " and reaſon on our ſide, that the avowed " ends of religious, and the real ends of " civil Society, are ſo diſtinct as to require " diſtinct powers, and a mutual indepen- " dency. The Salvation of Souls is not " the immediate end of civil Society, and " I wiſh it was not rather the pretence, " than the end of eccleſiaſtical policy; " but if to abſtain from evil and to do " good works, be means of ſalvation, " the means of ſalvation are the objects " of civil Government. It is the duty of " Princes and Magiſtrates to promote a " ſtrict obſervation of the Law of Nature, " of private and public morality, and to " make thoſe who live in ſubjection to " them, good men, in order to make them " good citizens. For this purpoſe, the

" ballance

" ballance and the ſword are put into their
" hands, that they may meaſure out pu-
" niſhment to every one, who injures the
" Community, or does wrong to his neigh-
" bour; and a rigorous puniſhment of
" crimes, eſpecially if it be accompanied
" with rewards and encouragements to vir-
" tue, *for both are intruſted to the ſame*
" *men* [3], is the ſureſt way not only to
" reform the outward behaviour, but to
" create an habitual inward diſpoſition to
" the practice of Virtue [4]."

We may, ſays his Lordſhip, *deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil Society, are ſo diſtinct.*—Here he contradicts his maſter LOCKE. This indeed is a ſmall matter. I ſhall ſhew he contradicts Truth, and the whole ſyſtem of human affairs.—But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.—*We may*

[3] This is ſaid, I ſuppoſe, in confutation of what is aſſerted in the Book of the *Alliance*, (to ſhew the imperfection of the plan of civil power) that *reward* is not (as it is generally underſtood to be) one of the Sanctions of civil government, in the ſenſe that *Puniſhment* is ſo. But as this is all his Lordſhip has to ſay againſt it, I ſhall here let the matter reſt between them.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 414.

ſays

ſays his Lordſhip, *deny that the* AVOWED *ends of religious, and the* REAL *ends of civil Society, are ſo diſtinct, as to require diſtinct powers and a mutual dependency.* The *avowed ends*, does he ſay? *Avowed* by whom? Common ſenſe requires he ſhould mean, *avowed* by thoſe who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have ſaid *real*; for the *avowed* and the *real* ends coincide: He *ſhould* have ſaid *real*; for the fairneſs of the propoſition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require the uſe of this word. But by what he predicates of theſe *avowed ends*, *viz.* their *not requiring diſtinct powers*, we ſee, he means *avowed* by corrupt Churchmen. *The ſalvation of ſouls* (ſays he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of eccleſiaſtical policy:* and theſe *ends* are Church Uniformity for the ſake of ſpiritual dominion. Now theſe *avowed ends*, we readily confeſs, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordſhip, after all his declamation againſt ſpiritual tyranny, coming at laſt, in the true ſpirit of a free thinking politician, to profeſs that religious perſecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as

juſtly

juſtly and reaſonably employed in matters of conſcience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now tho' this be altogether upon principle, (for what ſhould reſtrain a Stateſman who believes nothing of the *truth of religion*, and ſees all the miſchiefs of *diverſity of opinions*, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) yet you would not have *expected* it in this place, where his Lordſhip is defending religious Liberty, againſt the wicked Author of the *Alliance*; nor would you have *found* it, had not the diſtreſſes of controverſy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle, that the Church was a ſociety, independent of the civil, as not having coercive power like the civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordſhip was forced to deny the minor, and ſo unawares has brought in *perſecution* as one of the natural powers of the Church. But to compaſs this matter neatly, and without noiſe, he has recourſe to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expreſſion, the *abuſe* of the thing for the *thing itſelf*.—*The avowed ends of religious—the real ends of civil ſociety*.—But it was ſo glaring a truth, that the *ſalvation of ſouls* was the

real

real end of religious, and *the ſecurity of temporal intereſts, the only end* of civil Society, that he muſt have loſt his ſenſes who could be brought to believe, that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the firſt as the ſecond; or that *inſtruction and exhortation*, was as proper to promote the ſecond as the firſt: one of which things, his aſſertion, *that the Church and State have not diſtinct powers*, neceſſarily implies: To diſguiſe this abſurdity therefore, for *real*, which fair argument required, he ſubſtitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cauſe required. And under cover of this, he denies, that the two ſocieties are SO DISTINCT *as to require diſtinct powers.*—Well, this however we underſtand; and have thoroughly canvaſſed. But what mean the words that follow? — *And a mutual independency.* The author of the *Alliance* indeed had ſaid, that the ends of the two ſocieties were ſo diſtinct as to require *diſtinct powers.* But he was not ſo abſurd to add—*and a mutual independency*; becauſe, *independency* was not the *means* of attaining an end, like *diſtinct powers*, but a *conſequence* of thoſe powers: for if the powers, by which two ſocieties are adminiſtered,

niſtered, be *different*, thoſe ſocieties, (ſeeing their adminiſtrations can never claſh,) muſt needs be *independent* on one another. This is given only as another inſtance of the cloudy conception this great Politician had of the plain argument of the *Alliance*; and the firſt principles of Laws and Politics.

Let me now proceed with his reaſoning. He is to prove, what he had aſſerted, that the two ſocieties *are not ſo diſtinct as to require diſtinct powers*. He is writing againſt the book of the *Alliance*; the author of which lays it down as a principle, that the end of the *religious* is *ſalvation of Souls*; the end of the *Civil*, *ſecurity of temporal intereſts*. To this his Lordſhip replies, that ſalvation of ſouls is only the *pretended* end of the Religious; but the *real*, tho' not *immediate* end, of the Civil. And thus he has, with great dexterity, deſtroyed all diſtinction between the two Societies.

I have already detected both the fraud and fallacy of the firſt part of his aſſertion; I come now to the other, that *ſalvation of ſouls is the real, tho' not immediate, end of civil Government*. Here the meanneſs of his ſophiſtry is ſtill more apparent, than in the

the foregoing inſtance. It ſtands thus,— "The *immediate* end of civil government is confeſſed, on all hands to be *ſecurity of temporal intereſts.* — This is done by keeping men *to abſtain from evil,* and exciting them to *good works.* —*Good works are the means of ſalvation*—Therefore the *means of ſalvation are the objects of civil government*; or, in other words, the ſalvation of ſouls is at leaſt the *mediate* end of civil Society."

The Author of the *Alliance* had obviated all this poor ſophiſtry in the following words: "Civil Government, I ſuppoſe, "will be allowed to have been invented "for the attainment of ſome certain end or "ends excluſive of others: and this implies "the neceſſity of diſtinguiſhing this end "from others. Which diſtinction ariſes "from the different properties of the "things pretending. But amongſt all "thoſe things which are apt to obtrude, or "have in fact obtruded, upon men as the "ends of civil Government, there is but "one difference in their properties, as "ends: which is this, *that one of theſe is* "*attainable by civil Society only, and all* "*the reſt are eaſily attained without it.*

The thing then with the firſt mentioned property muſt needs be that *genuine end* of civil Society. And this is no other than *ſecurity to the temporal liberty and property of man* [5].

But his Lordſhip's ſophiſtry conſiſts in the ambiguity of the word END, which either ſignifies the conſequence or iſſue of a *mean*, ſimply; or, the conſequence and iſſue, with intention and fore-thought. In the firſt ſenſe it may be true, that ſalvation is the mediate end of civil Society; but then it is nothing to the purpoſe. In the ſecond ſenſe it is to the purpoſe, but not true. The civil Magiſtrate, all men ſee, had not this conſequence or iſſue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his puniſhments to unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinouſneſs of the offence, as eſtimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* Religion, but on their malignity to civil Society. A plain proof, that, when he meaſured out puniſhments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* conſiderations in his view. But you ſhall hear what the Author of the

[5] *Alliance*, p. 32—3.

Alliance has ſaid on this ſubject, who had confuted his Lordſhip's ſophiſm before he had conceived it.

" We have ſhewn (ſays this writer) " that it was the care of the *Bodies*, not of " the *Souls* of men, that the Magiſtrate undertook to give account of. Whatever " therefore refers to the *body*, is in his juriſdiction; whatever to the ſoul, is not. " But, and if there be that which refers " equally to both (as *Morals* plainly do) " ſuch thing muſt needs be partly within, " and partly without his province; that " is, it is to be *partially* conſidered by " him; his care thereto extending ſo far " only as it affects Society. The other " conſideration of it, namely as it makes " part of Religion, being in the Hands " of thoſe, who preſide in another kind " of Society. Again, with regard to " civil practice; if we caſt our eye on any " Digeſt of Laws, we find that evil actions have their annexed puniſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* " not in proportion to their deviation from " the eternal rule of right: nor as they " are SINS, *i, e.* not in proportion to their " deviation from the extraordinary reveal-

" ed will of God; which two things in-
" deed coincide: but as they are CRIMES,
" *i. e.* in proportion to their malignant
" influence on civil Society. But the
" view in which the *State* regards the
" *practice of Morality* is evidently ſeen in
" its recognition of that famous maxim,
" by which penal laws in all Communi-
" ties are faſhioned and directed, THAT
" THE SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT
" MUST ALWAYS RISE IN PROPORTION
" TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME.
" A maxim evidently *unjuſt* were actions
" regarded by the the State, juſt as they
" are in themſelves; becauſe the *Law of*
" *Nature* enjoins only in proportion to the
" ability of performance; and human abi-
" lities abate in proportion to the contrary
" propenſities: evidently *impious*, were acti-
" ons regarded by the State, as they refer
" to the will of God, becauſe this State-
" meaſure directly contradicts his method
" and rule of puniſhing. But ſuppoſe the
" Magiſtrate's office to be what is here
" aſſigned, and his aim muſt be the SUP-
" PRESSION of *crimes*, or of thoſe actions
" which malignantly affect ſociety; and

" then nothing can be more reaſonable
" than this proceeding. For then his end
" muſt be the good of the *whole* not of
" *particulars*, but as they come within
" that view. But the good of the whole
" being to be procured only, by the *pre-*
" *vention* of crimes, and thoſe to which
" there is the greateſt propenſity being of
" the moſt difficult prevention, the full
" ſeverity of his Laws muſt of neceſſity be
" turned againſt theſe [6]."

But, his Lordſhip goes on to tell us, What thoſe *means* are which Princes and Magiſtrates employ to procure this *mediate end* of civil Society, the *Salvation of Souls*; and they are, he ſays, *coercive* force. — *For this purpoſe, the ballance and the ſword are put into their hands, that they may meaſure out puniſhment to every one, who injures the community or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous puniſhment of crimes, eſpecially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the ſureſt way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue.*

[6] *Alliance*, p. 35—6—7.

Who

Who would have expected that it ſhould come at laſt to this, ſo contrary to his Lordſhip's aſſertion in the caſe of an *extraordinary providence*, That a vigorous and exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments, under the *Magiſtrate's Providence* (which indeed is the only one his Lordſhip thinks worth a ruſh) ſhould be ſo far from *taking away merit and making virtue ſervile*, that it is the *ſureſt way of creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue!* i. e. the ſureſt way of making virtue *free* and *meritorious*. But there is ſomething wonderfully perverſe in his Lordſhip's conduct. The exact diſtribution of Rewards and Puniſhments by Heaven, makes virtue worthleſs and ſervile, tho' the adminiſtration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way, if any, of *creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will believe him, the exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by the civil Magiſtrate, makes virtue free and meritorious, tho' the Magiſtrate cannot operate on the mind and intention, the only way of *creating an inward diſpo-*

ſition to the practice of virtue, that is, of making it free and meritorious.

But to come to the point, which theſe obſervations naturally introduce. The very *means* he aſſigns for the promotion of this imaginary *end*, namely *coercive force*, for *ſalvation of ſouls*, entirely ſubverts his poſition, and ſhews this could be no end of civil Society, ſince the means are in no wiſe calculated to promote the end; it not being action ſimply, that intitles to the favour of God, but action upon adequate motives. Now with theſe, (which reſult into what we call *conſcience*,) *force*, or coertion, is abſolutely inconſiſtent: force may make Hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of religion can make men lovers of Virtue.

Now if it be by ſuch kind of reaſoning as this that the *whole edifice of eccleſiaſtical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground*, (to uſe his Lordſhip's big language) Church Power was never worth the building.

But to proceed. His Lordſhip tells us next, that, " A clergy might co-operate " with the civil Magiſtrate very uſefully, " no doubt, by exhortations, reproofs,

" and

" and example. — This they might do as
" assistants to the civil Magistrate, in con-
" cert with him, and in subordination to
" him. *To what purpose therefore do they*
" *claim and affect independency on him?*
" Greater power never did, nor can ena-
" ble them to do greater good. Would
" they erect a tribunal to *punish inten-*
" *tions?* The very pretence is imper-
" tinent. Would they erect it to *punish*
" *where no injury is offered, nor wrong*
" *done?* The design is unjust and arbitrary.
" The ideas of crimes are determinate and
" fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter them.
" The ideas of Sins are more confused and
" vague; and we know by long and ge-
" neral experience, how they vary in the
" minds, or at least in the writings of ca-
" suists. Would they erect such a tribu-
" nal *to try the orthodoxy of man's faith?*
" Such a one is erected in some countries,
" under the name of the Inquisition, and
" is justly detested in all. To what end
" and purpose then can SPIRITUAL COURTS
" and COERCIVE POWERS ATTRIBUTED
" TO THE CLERGY serve, unless it be to
" make them judges and parties in their

" own cauſe, when matters of intereſt are
" concerned [7]?"

His Lordſhip it muſt be remembered, is here reaſoning with the Author of the *Alliance* againſt his notions of the rights of a Clergy in an eſtabliſhed Church. And the noble perſon's firſt miſrepreſentation, you ſee, is, that this Author holds, that the Clergy remain independent on the State *during* their eſtabliſhment; and that the coercive power exerciſed by them, under the Alliance, is *inherent* in their order. *To what purpoſe* (ſays his Lordſhip) *do they* [the Clergy] CLAIM AND AFFECT *independency on him, the civil Magiſtrate?* And again, *To what end and purpoſe can ſpiritual Courts, and coercive powers,* ATTRIBUTED *to the Clergy, ſerve?* And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addreſſing himſelf to POPE, he ſays, " Amongſt all the fallacies which
" have been employed by Churchmen,
" one of the moſt abſurd has been ad-
" vanced, tho' not invented, by a paradoxi-
" cal Acquaintance of yours; and it is to
" maintain the INDEPENDENCY of the
" Church, and to ſuppoſe, AT THE SAME
" TIME, a ſort of original Contract be-

[7] Vol. iv. p. 415—16.

" tween

" tween the Church and State, the terms of " which, every whimſical Writer, EVEN " THIS SCRIBLER, adjuſts as he pleaſes [8]." Falſhood and ill language commonly go together.

You ſhall now hear what the Author of the *Alliance* holds on theſe two points, and from his own mouth. Firſt, as to the *independency*.—" Let us ſee next (ſays he) what " the STATE gains by it [the *Alliance*.] " Theſe [advantages] in a word may be " comprized in ITS SUPREMACY IN MAT- " TERS ECCLESIASTICAL. THE CHURCH " RESIGNING UP HER INDEPENDENCY, and " making the Magiſtrate her SUPREME " HEAD, without whoſe approbation and " allowance, ſhe can adminiſter, tranſact, " or decree nothing [9]."

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. " The " third and laſt PRIVILEGE THE CHURCH " GAINS, by this Alliance, is the being " INTRUSTED WITH A JURISDICTION " INFORCED BY COACTIVE POWER [10]."

His Lordſhip tells us, the Author of the Alliance holds, that the *independency* of the Church is *retained* in an eſtabliſh-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 417. [9] *Alliance*, p. 147.
[10] *Alliance*, p. 134.

ment:

ment: the Author himſelf, ſays that it is *given up*. His Lordſhip tells us, the Author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the Church: the Author himſelf ſays, that *coercive power is a grant of the State*, during the Alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordſhip has improved upon his Maſters, the Authors of the *Rights of the Chriſtian Church*, and of the *independent Whig*. They had ventured indeed to charge both theſe doctrines on the body of the Engliſh Clergy. But as one can never be ſure what an indiſcreet or corrupt member of ſo large a body may have ſaid, the confutation of this calumny was not eaſy. His Lordſhip is *more bold*, he charges theſe opinions on a particular member of the eſtabliſhed Church, by name: but then he is *more fair*, he puts it in the power of the perſon injured to do himſelf juſtice; for it ſo happens, that this perſon not only denies the *independency* of the Church under an eſtabliſhment, and all claim to *inherent coercive power* whatſoever, but has laid down principles to diſcredit, and rules to prevent the return of thoſe uſurpations. The Author of the *Alliance* has vindicated

cated [1] the Engliſh Clergy from the prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON; It had been hard, could he have found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the ſame calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As therefore, no *independency* in *alliance*, is either claimed or affected; and no *inherent coercive power is attributed to the clergy*, We will ſuppoſe his Lordſhip's ſimple queſtion to be, "For what end is that tribunal, called a *Spiritual Court*, erected?" And had he been ſo fair to have let the Author of the *Alliance*, to whom he addreſſes his queſtion, ſpeak for himſelf, he would not have waited for an Anſwer. This Author tells us, in the moſt conſpicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* [2]. But, as if he had entirely left us to ourſelves to conjecture how he intended to employ this *ſpiritual tribunal*, his Lordſhip falls a gueſſing: and there is no kind of abſurdity, he does not propoſe, as favoured by the Author of the *Alliance*, tho' they be ſuch as this Author had already exploded.

[1] *Alliance*, p. 81, & ſeq. [2] *Ibid.* p. 134.

To

To what purpoſe, ſays his Lordſhip, *do the clergy claim and affect independency on the Magiſtrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to* PUNISH INTENTIONS? *The very pretence is impertinent.*

Before I come to his Lordſhip's *conjecture*, give me leave, Sir, to ſay one word of the happineſs of his *induction*. This *Tribunal*, or this *coercive power*, which he makes to follow independency, is ſo far from being produced by it, that *coercive power* never comes into the Church till it has given up it's *independency*. The Author of the *Alliance* aſſigns a plain reaſon for it.—" The State (ſays he) having, " by this *Alliance*, beſtowed upon the " Clergy a Juriſdiction with *coactive pow-* " *er*, this privilege would create an IM- " PERIUM IN IMPERIO had not the *civil* " *Magiſtrate* in return, the *ſupremacy of* " *the Church* [3]."

And now, to his conjectures. Is it, ſays he, *to puniſh intentions?* The Author of

[3] *Alliance*, p. 149.

the

the *Alliance* ſays, No, it is for *reformation of manners only*. But you underſtand not half his drift, unleſs you conſider theſe queſtions as propoſed to inſinuate, that the Author of the *Alliance* held the Abſurdities contained in them. So here, for inſtance, you are to underſtand, that the Author of the *Alliance* held this Tribunal was to *puniſh intentions*. However, I will acquit his Lordſhip of malice; it ſeems to be an innocent blunder. The Author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a *Tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and by ill luck, his Lordſhip miſtook this tribunal, for a *ſpiritual Court*. The Author's words are theſe — " The effectual " correction of ſuch evils [as ariſe from " the *intemperance of the ſenſual appetites*] " muſt be begun by moderating and ſubduing the Paſſions themſelves. But this, " civil Laws are not underſtood to preſcribe, " as puniſhing thoſe paſſions only when " they proceed to act: and not rewarding " the attempts to ſubdue them. *It muſt be a* " *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as* " *criminal which can do this; and that is* " *no other than the tribunal of Religion.*

" When this is done, a coactive power of " the civil kind may have a good effect, but " not till then. And who ſo proper to apply " this coactive power, in ſuch caſes, as " that Society, which fitted and prepared " the ſubject, for it's due reception and " application [4]." This *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*, the Author calls the *tribunal of Religion*, (*Forum conſcientiæ*) and diſtinguiſhes it from that tribunal, which is inveſted with *coactive power of the civil kind*, called *ſpiritual Courts:* He makes the firſt a preparative to the other. Yet, ſtrange to believe! his Lordſhip miſtook this *tribunal of Religion*, ſo deſcribed and diſtinguiſhed, for a *ſpiritual Court:* and upbraids the Author of the *Alliance*, for ſupporting a *tribunal with coercive powers*, *to* PUNISH INTENTIONS. But we ſhall ſee more of his Lordſhip's acuteneſs of this kind, as we go along.

His ſecond charge againſt the principles of the *Alliance* is in theſe words — *Would they erect this tribunal to puniſh, where* NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE? *The deſign is unjuſt and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed.*

[4] *Alliance*, p. 99—100.

The

The Magiſtrate cannot alter them. The ideas of ſins are more confuſed and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the writings of Caſuiſts.

To puniſh where no injury is offered nor wrong done, is his Lordſhip's periphraſis of the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, which the Author of the *Alliance* makes one branch of the *reformation of manners*, and conſequently an object of ſpiritual Courts. But his Lordſhip's own opinion of the *quality of vague luſt*, intimated in this periphraſis, is but a ſecond conſideration. His principal ending in giving it, was to diſcredit the tyranny of ſpiritual courts, in puniſhing where no fault is committed. To forget his BIBLE is no diſhonour: but to forget his HORACE is a diſgrace indeed. Now this honeſt Pagan reckons the prohibition of *vague luſt*, as one of the chief purpoſes of *civil laws*.

" Fuit hæc ſapientia quondam
" Publica privatis ſecernere, ſacra prophanis;
" CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO; dare jura
" maritis.

All this is ſo very extraordinary, that you would not readily believe his Lordſhip

ſhip could deſign the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, by the words — *puniſhing where no injury is offered nor wrong done*, did he not ſo clearly explain himſelf, in his curious diſtinction between *crimes* and *ſins*: which, becauſe it was occaſioned by, and alludes to, a paſſage in the *Alliance*, I will firſt beg leave to tranſcribe that paſſage: "If we "caſt our eye on any digeſt of Laws, we "find that evil actions have their annexed "puniſhment denounced, not as they are "VICES, *i. e.* in proportion to their devia-"tion from the eternal rule of right: "nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in pro-"portion to their deviation from the ex-"traordinary revealed will of God; which "two things indeed coincide: but as "they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion "to their malignant influence on civil So-"ciety [5]." The Author of the *Alliance* ſaid this, to ſhew that the civil Magiſtrate does not concern himſelf with Religion, *as ſuch*. His Lordſhip borrows the ſame diſtinction between *crimes* and *ſins*, to ſhew that it is *arbitrary and unjuſt* to puniſh *ſins*, as *ſpiritual Courts* undertake to do: for, ſays he, *the ideas of* CRIMES

[5] *Alliance*, p. 35—6.

are

are determinate and fixed: The ideas of SINS *are more confuſed and vague.* From this, it appears, that his Lordſhip miſtook *vices, ſins, and crimes*, for different actions: whereas they are the ſame actions under different conſiderations, as they reſpect *natural light*, *revealed Religion*, or *civil laws*; and ſo have different names impoſed upon them. The *ideas* therefore of theſe three modifications of forbidden actions are all *equally determinate and fixed*, or *equally confuſed and vague.* But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordſhip to object to the *confuſed and vague idea of* SINS, ſince this idea is formed upon the *revealed will of God in the Goſpel*, which, in a hundred places of his ESSAYS he tells us, coincides with the *eternal rule of right*; a rule, which he acknowledges to be moſt determinate and fixed of all things.

But he ſays, *the Magiſtrate cannot alter the ideas of crimes, as the Caſuiſt may, the idea of ſins.* That is, the Magiſtrate cannot give the Name of Crimes to innocent actions. What ſhould hinder him? He had two advantages above the Caſuiſt. Firſt *coercive power*: ſecondly the *vague and confuſed* meaſure to which crimes refer;

namely, to the *influence of actions on Society*. Matter of fact confirms this obſervation. Look round the World; enquire through antient and modern Times, and you ſhall find, that the *Magiſtrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuſe in ranging actions under the idea of *Crimes*, than the *Caſuiſt*, in ranging actions under the idea of *Sins*. This was not improper to be obſerved in anſwer to his Lordſhip's *experience*, which uſhers in his old ſophiſm, ready at every turn to do him ſervice, the *abuſe* of the thing for the thing *itſelf*—*We know*, ſays he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of ſins vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the* WRITINGS *of caſuiſts*. By which it would ſeem, his Lordſhip knows as little of *Caſuiſts*, as of any other ſort of learned men, whoſe characters he has been ſo free with: For corrupt caſuiſtry does not ſo much conſiſt *in varying the ideas of Sins*, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the puniſhment denounced againſt them.

His laſt conjecture about the uſe of an eccleſiaſtical Tribunal, on the principles of

of the *Alliance*, is, that it is erected for the puniſhment of opinions. *Would they erect*, ſays he, *ſuch a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, ſays the Author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain words as he can ſpeak; NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION [6]: And he not only ſays it, but proves it too [7]. *To what end and purpoſe then*, ſays his Lordſhip, can *ſpiritual courts and coercive powers ſerve, unleſs it be to make the clergy judges and parties in their own cauſe, when matters of intereſt are concerned? — To what end?* The Author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But ſuch an anſwer did not ſerve his Lordſhip's purpoſe. He will make the Author ſay as he would have him, or injoin him ſilence, and anſwer for him, himſelf. He inſinuates therefore, in the laſt place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal intereſt of the Clergy is concerned, and where they become Judges in their own cauſe. Hear again what the Author of the *Alliance* ſays upon this head;

[6] *Alliance*, p. 136. [7] P. 137—8.

" CIVIL MATTERS, which temporal courts " may conveniently inſpect, can never be- " long to an eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction. It " hath been ſhewn, that this Court was " erected as a ſuccedaneum to the Civil, " to take cognizance of ſuch actions as the " Civil could not reach, or could not re- " medy: which ſhews, the State could " never intend to put thoſe things under " the eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction that fall " moſt conveniently under it's own. Be- " ſides, for eccleſiaſtical Courts to ingroſs " matters that belong to the civil juriſdic- " tion, as it can poſſibly have no good uſe, " may very poſſibly be attended with this " evil, of inviting and encouraging the " Church to aim at more power than is " conſiſtent, either with her own good, " or the good of the State. The great " Founder of our Religion ſaid, *Who made* " *me a Judge or Divider between you?* " And what he would not aſſume to him- " ſelf, he would hardly beſtow upon his " Church: and that the State ſhould ever " intend to give her what was the pecu- " liar right of temporal Courts, is as diffi- " cult to ſuppoſe. We muſt conclude " then, that ſuch practice, wherever it is

" found,

" found, was derived not from the rea-
" ſonable Laws of this Alliance, but from
" the authority of old papal uſurpa-
" tions [8]." Thus far the Author of the *Alliance*; where you may find a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe.

His Lordſhip goes on with his confutation. — " By admitting the independency
" of the Church on the State, the State
" acknowledges an original independency
" in the Church, derived from a greater
" authority than her own: and the ſup-
" poſed terms of *Union* may be conſtrued
" to be rather conceſſions of the religious
" Society to the civil, for the ſake of or-
" der and peace, than grants of the civil
" to the religious Society. Thus Religi-
" on and the Church are ſet on the ſame
" foot: no human authority can alter
" one, but muſt receive it in *the terms* in
" which it has been revealed; and ſo may
" a good Caſuiſt prove on this hypotheſis,
" that no human authority can meaſure
" out any conditions of Eſtabliſhment to
" the other. Thus the State becomes no
" better than a coordinate, but inferior
" power [9]." I once met with a Phi-

[8] *Alliance*, p. 138—9—40. [6] V. iv. p. 417.

loſopher of deep thought, who profeſſed the ſame reverence for *artificial Nonſenſe*, that the Turks pay to *natural Folly*. His Syſtem on this point was very ſingular. He ſuppoſed that, as in the *material* World there was an univerſal, tho' very ſubtile, fire, diffuſed in ſecret thro' all bodies; which, by a late contrivance might be allured or drawn out from the moſt inanimate or lumpiſh Matter, even from the dirty ſhoes of the Chronologer of Leiceſter, who makes Time of Eternity; ſo, in the *intellectual*, that there was a certain witty Spirit, which lay dormant in the moſt inexplicable Nonſenſe; and only wanted the application of ſome Engine of analogous invention to rouſe it, and ſet it free. 'Till ſuch a one be diſcovered, we can but gueſs at his Lordſhip's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the Church on the State, (ſays he) *the State acknowledges an original independency in the Church derived from a greater Authority than her own.* If, by *Church*, he means the chriſtian Church, it is confeſſed that its independency is derived from a greater authority than what the State claims for any of it's rights. But what are the conſequences his Lordſhip draws from

from thence? The firſt is, that *then the ſuppoſed terms of union may be conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious Society to the civil, for the ſake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious Society.* The *ſuppoſed terms* are terms of *Alliance* between two independent Societies. Theſe terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than *mutual conceſſions* and *mutual grants.* What then does he mean, by their being *conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious Society, than grants of the civil?* By the *ſuppoſition* on which his Lordſhip condeſcends to reaſon, when the Church in *Alliance* gives up its original *independency*, it is without doubt a *conceſſion*; becauſe it is giving up a right. And when the State, in *Alliance*, confers a *coercive power* on the Church, this too, is certainly a *grant*; becauſe an original independent religious Society can have no inherent coercive power. However ſome meaning, it is likely, his Lordſhip had. And it ſeems to be this, "That if the Church has an original independency, no ſuch *Alliance* as is ſuppoſed, could be made: for that the terms on the ſide of the Church, would not be *conditional* but

voluntary conceſſions, the State having nothing to give, in return." This would be talking ſenſe at leaſt, tho' not truth. But, to *ſuppoſe* the terms of this Union, which are mutual grants and mutual conceſſions; and then to deny mutual grants and mutual conceſſions, is giving ſuch a form to his argument as will need a *firſt Logic* to turn into ſenſe, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *firſt Philoſophy* to turn into truth. Thus much however you may ſee, Some cloudy conception his Lordſhip plainly had, that a ſociety of *divine* original could never enter into Alliance with another, only of *haman*. When the Sons of God came down amongſt the Daughters of Men, we are told they begot Giants. His Lordſhip betrays his apprehenſions, that this coalition between the civil and religious Societies would produce an iſſue altogether as monſtrous, a kind of STATE LEVIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the Author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a Pander or Procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehenſions were, his conception was very unworthy both of a Philoſopher and a Stateſman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath ſhewn

from

from the nature of things that Religion compoſes an independent ſociety: The GOSPEL, by divine inſtitution hath declared the Chriſtian Religion to be an independent ſociety. His LORDSHIP hath ſhewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent ſociety of the civil kind: And the LAW, by divine inſtitution, hath declared the Jewiſh Republic to be an independent civil ſociety. Now I would aſk his Lordſhip, if nothing hindered this *civil Society of divine Original*, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reaſons, excepted by name, what ſhould hinder this *religious Society of divine original*, from entering into Alliance with the State?

Another Conſequence which his Lordſhip draws from an original independency in the Church is, that RELIGION *and the* CHURCH *are ſet on the ſame foot*. That is, as I underſtand him, for he might have expreſſed himſelf better, the DISCIPLINE of the Church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE. The conſequence of which is, that the *State muſt receive the* CHURCH *on the terms in which it was revealed*. From whence ariſes another

other conſequence, that *no human Authority can meaſure out any conditions of eſtabliſhment to the Church:* and, from thence another, (for his Lordſhip's falſe conceptions are always attended with ſuperfetations,) that the *State becomes an inferior Power, or Creature to the Church.* All theſe brave conſequences, we ſee, ariſe out of this principle, " that, in a Church of Divine Original, the *Diſcipline* is as unalterable as the *Doctrine.*" And of the truth of this principle his Lordſhip is ſo confident, that he calls his Adverſary a *ſtupid Fellow* for not ſeeing it. " The STUPID FELLOW, who ad-
" vanced this Paradox in Engliſh, did not
" ſee how ill the parts of it hang toge-
" ther, nor that if eccleſiaſtical Govern-
" ment was, by divine appointment, in-
" dependent of civil, no ſuch contract as
" he ſuppoſes could be made. The reli-
" gious ſociety, notwithſtanding their
" known moderation, could not have part-
" ed from that independency, *and ſuperio-*
" *rity* over the civil power, which God
" had given them [10]."

It is true, this *ſtupid Fellow* did not ſee it. And I don't well know how

[10] Vol. iv. p. 418.

he

he ſhould; ſince, on the other hand, he ſaw it to be impoſſible that any *ſuch contract as he ſuppoſes* could be made, unleſs the Church or religious Society was *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which this Author ſuppoſes to have been made between Church and State? He tells us, in expreſs words, it is a *mutual compact by* FREE CONVENTION [1]. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleaſure of the contracting parties. But Parties who have this liberty, muſt needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reaſon, ſuch as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The Religious Society* (ſays he) *could not have parted from that independency*, AND SUPERIORITY, *over the civil Power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flouriſhing, we are come to the point: which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT? This is in truth a queſtion worth debating. But as his Lordſhip rarely ſuffers an important propoſition,

[1] *Alliance*, p. 87.

which

which he is ſet either upon denying or depraving, to paſs thro' his hands without firſt clouding it in the expreſſion with an abſurdity or an equivocation, I ſhall be obliged, before we can paſs forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarraſs. *The religious Society* (ſays he) *could not have parted from that independency* AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil power, which God hath given them.* Now as the Author of the *Alliance* contends only for the *independency* of the Church *before Alliance*, and as his Lordſhip's reaſoning acknowledges that the queſtion is only concerning this very independency, he muſt needs ſuppoſe, by adding, AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil*, that this *ſuperiority* is a conſequence of *independency*. And ſo, indeed, he ſpeaks of it more plainly juſt before, — *Thus*, [i. e. from the *independency* of the Church] *the State becomes no better than a coordinate*, BUT INFERIOR, *Power*. Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, *ſuperiority* is ſo far from following *independency*, that it cannot ſubſiſt with it. For why is religious Society by nature *independent*, (as the Author of the *Alliance* ſhews it is) but

for

for the reaſon that Author gives, that it is *eſſentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* [2].'' But there is no ground for ſuperiority of one Perſon or Society over another, but where ſome natural relation or connexion exiſts between them: none exiſts in this caſe; therefore a pretence of *ſuperiority* on the one ſide, and of *dependency* on the other, is abſurd. However, as I am verily perſuaded his Lordſhip did not know enough of theſe matters even to prevaricate neatly, in the point in queſtion, I conſider it as an innocent miſtake, ariſing from the following words of the *Alliance*, ſhamefully indeed, miſunderſtood.— " Such then is the nature of Chriſt's king-
" dom [*i. e.* the chriſtian Church] it is eſſen-
" tially framed to compoſe a firm and laſting
" Society; it is made ſuch by divine appoint-
" ment, and in order to fit it for public ſer-
" vice, it is both by nature and inſtitution
" declared SOVEREIGN, and *independent* of
" civil Government, that it may adapt it-
" ſelf by *free Alliance* to the various kinds
" of human Policies [3]." Now *ſove-
" reign and independent of civil govern-
" ment*, this great Writer has paraphraſed

[2] *Alliance*, p. 65. [3] *Ibid.* p. 180.

to

to ſignify, *independency and ſuperiority over the civil.*

But the queſtion itſelf, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY, WHICH GOD, *as well as the Nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT, his Lordſhip determines in the negative. *For if*, ſays he, *eccleſiaſtical Government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the Religious Society could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, created *free and independent*, therefore, according to this reaſoning, he could not part with his *independency*, and become ſubject to civil Laws. Hold, ſays his Lordſhip, Man was created free, that he might be ſubject to no civil laws but thoſe to which he had given his conſent; and he had a right to part with his independency in order to procure protection. And is not this the very caſe of Religious Society, which is only an artificial perſon, by nature free, and ſtanding in need of protection?

But his Lordſhip's aſſertion, you will find, bottoms at laſt upon this Principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL

IT'S

IT'S LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES: An Error which *Bigots* and *Fanatics* indeed, are equally fond of indulging, to the infinite diſſervice both of civil and of religious Society: But that a *philoſopher* and a *Stateſman* ſhould know ſo little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly aſtoniſhing. The firſt elements of his profeſſion might have taught him, "That the authority by which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in the eſſence of the thing." Natural and poſitive duties retain their reſpective eſſences in the Code of Religion. Natural duties are eternal; poſitive duties revocable. Of theſe latter, ſome are laſting as the diſpenſation to which they belong; others temporary. Of the temporary, ſome ceaſe not till expreſly revoked; others ceaſe with the occaſion that enjoined them. Theſe laſt are again to be diſtinguiſhed into privileges and duties; privileges may be receded from at pleaſure; but duties muſt either be revoked, or the occaſion muſt be plainly ſeen to ceaſe. Now the INDEPENDENCY, in queſtion, is one of thoſe inſtitutions in the divine Law, which ceaſes with the occaſion; and is beſides a privilege,

ledge, which may be receded from, at pleaſure. Again, In the divine Laws, ſome things are enjoined to be believed as truths; others to be practiſed as utilities. Of utilities ſome are general; others particular: The firſt of theſe are permanent and conſtant; the ſecond variable. Of the firſt, is the Churches compoſing a *Society:* of the ſecond, is the *particular form.* Thus, Jeſus ſeemed to inſtitute an equal miniſtry; the Apoſtles, epiſcopal Government; and modern Churches, both one and the other, as beſt ſuited to the various civil Governments with which they had allied.

As Chriſtianity was, by divine inſtitution, a *ſociety at large,* to authorize and to enable the ſeveral Churches to give particular forms to eccleſiaſtical Government; ſo the *independency* was beſtowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free Alliance with the State. When God himſelf allied the Jewiſh Church with the State, he left not that Religion a *ſociety at large,* neither did he ordain it *independent:* he preſcribed in the minuteſt manner the form of Church Government, and made it dependent on the State. But the Author of the *Alliance*

tells his ſtory better. " The chriſtian re-
" ligion (ſays he) was not only left *inde-*
" *pendent* of the State by not being united
" to it like the Jewiſh; (and being ſo
" left it muſt needs by the Law of nature
" be independent) but its independency
" was likewiſe ſecured by divine appoint-
" ment, in that famous declaration of it's
" founder, *My kingdom is not of this world*;
" which bears this plain and obvious ſenſe,
" *That the kingdom of Chriſt, to be extended*
" *over all Mankind, was not like the king-*
" *dom of God, confined to the Jewiſh people,*
" *where Religion was incorporated with the*
" *State*; *and therefore*, of this world, *as*
" *well in the exerciſe of it, as in the re-*
" *wards and puniſhments by which it was*
" *adminiſtered: but was independent of all*
" *civil communities*; *and therefore, neither*
" of this world, *as to the exerciſe of it, nor*
" *as to the rewards and puniſhments by which*
" *it was adminiſtered.*— But whoever ima-
" gines that from this *independency by in-*
" *ſtitution*, the Church cannot convene
" and unite with the State, concludes
" much too faſt. We have obſerved, that
" this property in the *Kingdom of Chriſt*
" was given as a mark to diſtinguiſh it

" from the *kingdom of God*, that is, it was
" given to ſhew that this Religion ex-
" tended to all mankind; and was not,
" like the Moſaic, confined to one only
" people. Conſequently, that very rea-
" ſon which made it proper for the Mo-
" ſaic Religion to be united, by divine ap-
" pointment, to the State, made it fit,
" the Chriſtian ſhould be left free and in-
" dependent. But for what end, if not
" for this, To be at liberty to adapt itſelf
" to the many various kinds of civil poli-
" cies, by a ſuitable union and alliance.
" —An Alliance then we muſt conclude
" the chriſtian Church was at liberty to
" make, notwithſtanding this declared na-
" ture of *Chriſt's kingdom*. So far is true
" indeed, that it is debarred from entering
" into any ſuch *Alliance* with the State as
" may admit any LEGISLATOR in Chriſt's
" kingdom but himſelf [that is, a power in
" the Magiſtrate to alter *doctrines*.] But
" no ſuch power is granted or uſurped by
" the *ſupremacy* of the State [4]." [which extends only to DISCIPLINE.

From all this it appears, that the unalterable part of the Law of Chriſt is

[4] *Alliance*, p. 178—9, &c.

the

the DOCTRINE: and the only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE: but it is the latter, with which Society, as ſuch, is chiefly concerned, when it enters on *Alliance* with the Church. Therefore, when his Lordſhip ſays, *Religion and the Church being ſet on the ſame foot, no human authority can alter one, but muſt receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed*, if he means, there can be no alteration in *diſcipline*, I have ſhewn he is miſtaken: if he means, there can be no alteration in *doctrine*, he is certainly right; and I conſider his Lordſhip's obſervation as a complaint, that, by the conſtitution of the Chriſtian Church, the Magiſtrate cannot tyrannize over Conſcience.

In the mean time we ſee to what little purpoſe this great Philoſopher and Stateſman had read his HOOKER; of whom he confeſſes ſomething might be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have ſhewn him, that divine authority does not reduce all it's Laws to one and the ſame ſpecies. — "Poſitive "Laws (ſays this truly great Man) are ei-"ther permanent or elſe changeable, ac-"cording as the matter itſelf is, concern-

" ing which they were firſt made. Whe-
" ther GOD or MAN be the maker of them,
" ALTERATION they ſo far forth admit, as
" the MATTER doth exact. Wherefore,
" to end with a general rule concerning all
" the Laws which God hath tied men un-
" to: thoſe Laws divine, that belong,
" whether naturally or ſupernaturally, ei-
" ther to men as men, or to men as they
" live in politique Society, or to men as
" they are of that politique Society which
" is the Church, without any further re-
" ſpect had unto any ſuch variable acci-
" dent as the State of men, and of Socie-
" ties of men, and of the Church itſelf in
" this world, is ſubject unto; all Laws that
" ſo belong unto men, they belong for
" ever, yea altho' they be poſitive Laws,
" unleſs, being poſitive, God himſelf which
" made them alter them. The reaſon is,
" becauſe the ſubject or matter of Laws in
" general, is thus far forth conſtant:
" which matter is that for the ordering
" whereof, Laws were inſtituted, and be-
" ing inſtituted are not changeable with-
" out cauſe, neither can they have cauſe
" of change, when that which gave them
" their firſt inſtitution remaineth for ever

" one

" one and the ſame. *On the other ſide,* " *Laws that were made for men, or Socie-* " *ties, or Churches, in regard of their be-* " *ing ſuch as do not always continue, but* " *may perhaps be clean otherwiſe a-while af-* " *ter, and ſo may be required to be other-* " *wiſe ordered than before; the Laws of* " *God himſelf which are of this nature,* NO " MAN ENDOWED WITH COMMON SENSE " *will ever deny to be of a different con-* " *ſtitution from the former, in reſpect of* " *the one's conſtancy, and the mutability of* " *the other* [5]."

Thus far this country Parſon. And how meanly does his Lordſhip figure before him with his aſſertion, that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the Church, equally unalterable?* Yet this noble perſon, thus ignorant of the very firſt elements of Law, can harangue, with the air and authority of an Oracle, on a *patriot king*, on *civil liberty*, on *Church Tyranny*, and on the *ballance of power*. Maſter Hooker will tell you, how eaſily all this may be done without knowing more than our neighbours.

[5] *Eccl. Pol.* L. i. Sect. 15.

—" Thus far therefore (ſays he) we " have endeavoured, in part, to open, of " what nature and force laws are, accord- " ing unto their ſeveral kinds: the Law " which God himſelf hath eternally ſet " down to follow in his own works; the " Law which he hath made for his crea- " tures to keep; the Law of natural and " neceſſary Agents; the law which angels " in Heaven obey; the Law whereunto, " by the light of reaſon, men find them- " ſelves bound, in that they are men; " the Law which they made by compoſi- " tion for multitudes and politique Socie- " ties of men to be guided by; the Law " which belongeth unto each nation; the " Law that concerneth the fellowſhip of " all; and laſtly the Law which God " himſelf hath ſupernaturally revealed. " *It might peradventure have been more* " POPULAR AND MORE PLAUSIBLE TO " VULGAR EARS, *if this diſcourſe had been* " *ſpent in* EXTOLLING THE FORCE OF " LAWS, *in ſhewing the* GREAT NECESSI- " TY OF THEM, *when they are* GOOD, " and in AGGRAVATING THEIR OF- " FENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS ARE " INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. *But for-*

" *aſmuch as with ſuch kind of matter* THE " PASSIONS OF MEN *are rather ſtirred one* " *way or other, than* THEIR KNOWLEDGE " *any way ſet forward* unto the trial of " that whereof there is doubt made, I " have therefore turned aſide from that " BEATEN PATH, and choſen, tho' a " LESS EASY, yet a more profitable way, " in regard of the end we propoſe [6]."

Great Names, however, are ſtill of great ſervice to his Lordſhip: for tho' he cannot profit by their lights, he can ſhine at their expence: and, having well chicaned their expreſſions, can convert the truths, contained in them, to his own uſe. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind. HOOKER and LOCKE have been ſuppoſed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil Government. Alas! *nil ſine Theſeo.* There is nothing ſo well done, which his Lordſhip cannot mend. He reproves Both of them, with much ſolemnity, for *repreſenting mankind to themſelves, like a number of ſavage individuals out of Society, in their natural State, inſtead of conſidering them as members of families from their birth.* " This (he ſays) has made

[6] *Eccl. Pol.* L. i. Sect. 16.

" them reaſon INCONSISTENTLY, and on " a FALSE FOUNDATION. *Inconſiſtently*, " becauſe they ſometimes acknowledge pa- " ternal Government to have preceded " civil, and yet reaſon about the inſtituti- " on of civil, as if men had then firſt " aſſembled in any kind of ſociety, or had " been ſubject to any kind of rule; for " to ſay that the Law of nature was of it- " ſelf ſuch a rule, and that every one of " theſe independent inhabitants of the " earth did or might exerciſe Juſtice for " himſelf, and others on thoſe who violat- " ed the Law, was language unworthy of " Mr. LOCKE, and unneceſſary to his Syſ- " tem. — *Falſely*, becauſe it is eaſy to de- " monſtrate that mankind never was in " ſuch a State [7]."

To ſay the truth, *eaſy* enough, and like *demonſtrating* day-light. A man need only open his eyes to ſee that a Mother does not abandon her infant, as ſoon as ſhe has dropt it, nor the Father renounce the care of them. Is it poſſible then that HOOKER, LOCKE and their Followers, ſhould want, to be told by his Lordſhip ſo obvious a truth, " That, before civil Society, man-

[7] Vol. v. p. 125—6.

kind

kind ſtarted not up like muſhrooms, a number of ſavage individuals, but lived in tribes and families." Why then, you aſk, did not HOOKER and LOCKE ſo conſider them, when they were deducing the origin of civil Society? For two very important reaſons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

Firſt becauſe the real origin of civil Society appearing equally on either ſuppoſition, the truths, which followed from it, were clearer ſeen, as leſs embarraſſed, by conſidering mankind before civil Society as individuals.

But this was not all. Had They conſidered men before civil ſociety as ranked under tribes, the rights belonging to the Heads of families, thus brought into view, tho' neither relative to, nor connected with, thoſe of a civil kind, might have given too much countenance, to that abſurd Syſtem, which derives political Rule from the *Patriarchal*; a ſyſtem which, both for its abſurdities and miſchiefs, it was the purpoſe of LOCKE and HOOKER to diſcredit. The former therefore did judiciouſly to aſſert (as he might do it truly; for the *exerciſe of juſtice* no more belonged to Fathers

of

of Families, as ſuch, than the *exerciſe of Regal prerogative*) that, before the inſtitution of Civil Society, *every one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exerciſe juſtice for himſelf and others, on thoſe who violated the Law.* Yet this, his Lordſhip calls language unworthy of his Maſter. Nay, ſo great a ſtranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the repreſentation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we ſee it was done to keep the unwary from being miſled by the ſight of circumſtances of no uſe to aſſiſt an honeſt man's judgment, and which knaves might wreſt to the ſupport of error.

---But to proceed with our Subject. His Lordſhip goes on againſt the Book of the *Alliance* in this Manner: "This imaginary Contract, in ſhort, whether well or ill made, never exiſted at any time, nor in any Country; though, to have been real, and really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all Countries where Chriſtianity was propagated. Political Societies make and alter and break their *Alliances*, as the varying reaſon of ſtate ſuggeſts. Different orders of civil Government in the ſame

"Society

" Society change, and with them the " whole Conſtitution of ſuch Governments, " as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or the " diſpoſitions of men determine them. *But* " *a Religion given by God is in its nature* " *invariable.* And therefore if a Religi- " ous Society with certain privileges, " immunities, and prerogatives be neceſſary " to preſerve it ſo, the *order and conſtitu-* " *tion* of ſuch a Society muſt be *invariable* " too. The Church muſt be eſtabliſhed " by the ſame divine Authority as the Re- " ligion, and be by conſequence independ- " ent of the State. But nothing of this " kind has been. Chriſt's *Kingdom was* " *not of this World.* He ſent out his A- " poſtles to teach, and to baptize; and " the utmoſt power he gave them, beſides " that of working Miracles to convince and " to convert, was to ſhake off the duſt of " their feet, and to proteſt againſt the in- " fidelity of thoſe who refuſed to receive " them, and the Goſpel they publiſhed. " The Apoſtles ordained others to accom- " pany and to ſucceed them in the ſame " office, the office of teaching and baptiz- " ing. The Apoſtles could give no more " power than they received; and no ar-

" gument

" gument *of right* can be drawn from any " thing that paſſed, or from any thing " that theſe Men did for the Maintenance " of their Sect, while Chriſtianity was a " Sect [8.]"

This imaginary Contract (he ſays) *never exiſted at any time or in any country.* If he means, a *Contract* actually and formally executed, I have given an anſwer to that already, and have ſhewn, that the objection holds equally againſt *the original contract between King and People*; which I ſuppoſe his Lordſhip deems not to be altogether ſo *imaginary* but that the *prerogative* of the one, and the *rights* of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the principles there laid down. But you ſhall hear the Author of the *Alliance* on this matter.

" [9] When I ſay that *all* regular polici- " ed States had *an Eſtabliſhed Religion*, I " mean no more than He would do, who, " deducing Civil Society from its true O- " riginal, ſhould, in order to perſuade " Men of the Benefits it produces, affirm " that all Nations had a *Civil Policy*. For " as this Writer could not be ſuppoſed to

[8] Vol. iv. p. 419—20. [9] *Alliance*, p. 114—117.

" mean that every one conſtituted a free
" State, on the Principles of public Liber-
" ty, which yet was the only Society he
" purpoſed to prove was founded on Truth,
" and productive of public Good; becauſe
" it is notorious, that the far greater Part
" of Civil Policies are founded on different
" Principles; or abuſed to different Ends:
" ſo neither would I be underſtood to
" mean, when I ſay all Nations concurred
" in making this *Union*, that they all ex-
" actly diſcriminated the Natures, and
" fairly adjuſted the Rights of both Socie-
" ties, on the Principles here laid down;
" tho' an *Eſtabliſhment* reſulting from this
" Diſcrimination and Adjuſtment be the
" only one I would be ſuppoſed to recom-
" mend. On the contrary, I know this
" Union has been generally made on miſta-
" ken Principles; or, if not ſo, hath de-
" generated in length of Time; by which
" means the National Religion in the Pa-
" gan World hath been moſt commonly a
" Slave to the State; and in the Chriſtian
" Syſtem, the State ſometimes a Slave to
" the Eſtabliſhed Church. And as it was ſuffi-
" cient for that Writer's Purpoſe, that thoſe
" Societies, whether good or bad, proved the

" Senſe

" Senſe all Men had of the Benefits re-
" ſulting from Civil Policy in general,
" though they were oft miſtaken in the
" Application; ſo it is for Ours, that this
" univerſal Concurrence in the two Socie-
" ties to *unite*, ſhews the Senſe Mankind
" had of the Uſefulneſs of ſuch an *Union*.
" And laſtly, as that Writer's Principles
" are not the leſs true on account of the
" general Deviation from them in forming
" Civil Societies; ſo may not the plain
" ones of *Alliance* here delivered; tho' ſo
" few States have ſuffered themſelves to be
" directed by them in Practice; nor any
" Man before delivered them in Specula-
" tion; eſpecially if, as in that Caſe, ſo in
" *this*, we can derive ſuch *Miſtake* and
" *Degeneracy* from their Cauſes. It would
" draw me too far out of my Way to ex-
" plain diſtinctly the Cauſes of the *Miſtake*;
" and the intelligent Reader, who care-
" fully attends to the whole of this Diſ-
" courſe, will not be at a Loſs to diſcover
" the moſt conſiderable of them; ſome of
" which I have already hinted at; and
" others, I may poſſibly, in the Sequel of
" this Diſcourſe, take occaſion to mention.
" As for the *Degeneracy*, we have obſerv-
" ed,

" ed, that the *Alliance* is of the Nature of " the FOEDERA INÆQUALIA: Now, the " common Iſſue of ſuch, *Grotius* acquaints " us with, in theſe Words: *Interim verum* " *eſt accidere plerumque, ut qui ſuperior eſt* " *in fœdere,* SI IS POTENTIA MULTUM " ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM IMPERIUM " PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET: PRÆSER- " TIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT [9.]"

But if, by, *never exiſted*, his Lordſhip means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either Society, which naturally follow ſuch an *Alliance*, were never actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two Societies, his aſſertion is falſe. They are at this preſent actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two Societies, in ENGLAND, under our happy Conſtitution of Church and State. And it was a principal purpoſe of the Book of the *Alliance* to ſhew they are ſo, in order to realize the Theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words: " We ſee how unreaſonable and " even how impolitic our Adverſaries are, " when in their ill humour with *Eſtabliſh-* " *ments*, they chuſe to pick a quarrel with " their own; where the natural Religion

[9] *De jure Belli & Pacis*, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

" is

" is on a footing exactly agreeable to the " nature of a *free Convention between* " *Church and State*, on the principles of " the Laws of Nature and Nations. A " felicity, they ſhould have known, that " ſcarce any other People on the face of " the earth can boaſt of. In *England* " alone the original terms of this *Conven-* " *tion* are kept up to ſo exactly, that this " account of the *Alliance between Church* " *and State* ſeems rather a copy of the " Church and State of *England*, than a " Theory, as indeed it was, formed ſolely " on the contemplation of Nature, and " the unvariable reaſon of things [10.]

To make this contract (ſays his Lordſhip) *real, and to be really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all countries where Chriſtianity was profeſſed.* In other words, " *Right* muſt receive " it's nature from *Fact:*" or, in ſtill plainer terms, " Right becomes *Wrong* " when rejected, and *Wrong* becomes " *Right* when received." How would this ſound when applied to the ORIGINAL CONTRACT between Prince and People? —*to make it real and to be really authorized,*

[10] *Alliance*, p. 167-8.

it

it ſhould have been the ſame at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.

But *political Societies* (he ſays) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reaſon of ſtate ſuggeſts.* If he only ſpeaks of ſuch which make theſe *alterations* juſtly, it is the ſame in the *Alliance between Church and State.* The Author has ſhewn that, in this reſpect, the Alliances of political Societies with one another, and the Alliance of the political with the religious, ſtand juſt upon the ſame footing. " If there be (ſays " the Author) more religious Societies than " one at the time of Convention, the State " allies itſelf with the largeſt of thoſe religi- " ous Societies. It is *fit* the State ſhould do " ſo, becauſe the larger the religious Society " is, where there is an equality in other points, " the better enabled it will be to anſwer " the ends of the Alliance. It is *ſcarce* " *poſſible* it ſhould be otherwiſe, becauſe " the two Societies being compoſed of the " ſame individuals, the greatly prevailing " Religion muſt have a majority of it's " members in the aſſemblies of State, who " will naturally prefer their own religion " to any other. Hence we ſee the reaſon

" why the *Epiſcopal* is the eſtabliſhed
" Church in *England*; and the *Preſbyte-*
" *rian* the eſtabliſhed Church in *Scotland*.
" Hence too we ſee the reaſon of what was
" before obſerved, concerning the durati-
" on of this Alliance: that it is *perpetual*
" but not *irrevocable:* i. e. It ſubſiſts juſt
" ſo long as the Church, thereby eſtab-
" liſhed, maintains it's ſuperiority of ex-
" tent; which when it loſes to any conſi-
" derable degree, the Alliance becomes
" void. For the united Church being
" then no longer able to perform it's part
" of the Convention, which is formed on
" reciprocal conditions, the State becomes
" diſengaged: and a *new Alliance* is of
" courſe contracted with the now prevail-
" ing Church, for the reaſons which made
" the *old*. Thus formerly, the Alliance
" between the *Pagan Church* and the Em-
" pire of Rome was diſſolved; and the
" *Chriſtian* eſtabliſhed in it's place: and
" of late, the Alliance between the *Popiſh*
" *Church* and the Kingdom of England
" was broken; and another made with
" the *Proteſtant*, in it's ſtead [1.]"

[1] *Alliance*, p. 197-98.

Different

Different orders of civil government, in the ſame Society, change, (ſays his Lordſhip) *and with them the whole Conſtitution of ſuch Governments, as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or diſpoſitions of men determine them.* And is it not the ſame in Church-Government? It is here *Epiſcopacy*; there *Preſbytery*; and in another place *Independency*.

But, *a Religion given by God is in its nature invariable.* In its DOCTRINE it is confeſſed to be ſo. Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewiſe, (ſays his Lordſhip) and thus ſtands my argument, *If a religious Society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be neceſſary to preſerve it ſo, the order and conſtitution of ſuch a Society muſt be invariable too.* The inference is juſt. But who, that holds the principles of the *Alliance*, againſt which his Lordſhip is here arguing, ever ſuppoſed, that *one certain ſet of privileges, immunities and prerogatives* was neceſſary to preſerve a religious Society in that State and Condition? They ſay, Religion compoſed a Society before it had any of thoſe *privileges, immunities and prerogatives*; none of which it had till it came into Alliance with the State; and none of which

it holds longer than the Alliance laſts. But, if by a ſtrange liberty of expreſſion, his Lordſhip means, by *privileges, immunities and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, ſo far forth as it is a Society; I own that this is *neceſſary to preſerve a religious Society* in the State and Condition of a Society: But then, give me leave to ſay, it does not follow from thence, that *the order and conſtitution of ſuch a Society muſt be invariable too:* Becauſe Church Government may be adminiſtred by an Epiſcopacy, a Preſbytery, or an Independency. The Specific form of Church-Government amongſt the Jews was preſcribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, becauſe Moſes united the Religion to the State, under the collective name of LAW: The ſpecific form of Church-Government amongſt Chriſtians was not preſcribed, and therefore none ſeems intended to be invariably followed, becauſe Jeſus did not unite his Religion to the State, but left it to particular Churches to follow ſuch as was moſt agreeable to the forms of thoſe civil Societies, in which they were to be eſtabliſhed. For this purpoſe it was ſufficient that he inſtituted his Religion, a *Society*, by directing the members

members of it to *hear the Church*, and by appointing Officers as its organs to convey it's deciſions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the *Alliance*, who ſpeaking of the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* Churches, has theſe words: "This, Both had in common, to be poli-"tical Societies by divine appointment; "but different in this, that GOD, for *wiſe* "*ends*, minutely preſcribed the whole mode "of Jewiſh policy: and CHRIST, on the "contrary, with the ſame divine wiſdom "only conſtituted his Church a policied "Society in general; and left the mode "of it to human diſcretion [2]."

Thoſe *ends*, the Author thus explains, in another place. "The *Jewiſh* Religion "was, like the true *natural*, which it rati-"fied, eſſentially fitted to compoſe a So-"ciety; and like the *Chriſtian*, of which it "was the firſt rudiment, really ſuch by "divine appointment. But then unlike "the Chriſtian, in this, that it was not "left independent of civil Government, "to unite with it at its pleaſure, on terms "agreed upon; but was for great and "wiſe reaſons inſtantaneouſly united to it,

[2] *Alliance*, p. 164.

" by God himſelf. Which alſo he was
" pleaſed to do, not by way of *Alliance* as
" between two bodies that were to continue
" diſtinct, but by mutual converſion into one
" another, and perfect incorporation [3]."

His Lordſhip then owns, that if *the Church be eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the religion*, (that is, if religion be formed by it into a Society) *it is by conſequence independent of the State.* I am apt to ſuſpect, he here grants more than he is aware of: For it follows from this conceſſion, that if the Chriſtian Religion even compoſes a Society by nature, tho' not by divine appointment, it muſt be *independent* of the State: becauſe the *independency* does not ariſe from the *Authority* which formed it, but from the *nature* eſſential to it. And the Author of the Alliance has ſhewn [4] that Religion compoſes a Society by natural right. His Lordſhip's endeavour therefore to avoid the *conſequence* of *independency*, by affirming that *the Church was not eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the Religion*, would be to no purpoſe even tho' he could prove it. However let us hear how he ſupports his opinion.

[3] *Alliance*, p. 176. [4] Book i. c. 5.

His

His firſt argument is the declaration of Jeſus himſelf, that *his Kingdom was not of this World.* The very argument employed by the Author of the *Alliance*, to prove the contrary. The queſtion is, whether Chriſt's Religion compoſes a Society; and his Lordſhip quotes a declaration of our Saviour, to prove it does not; which, by the very terms, proves it does. For what is a *Kingdom* but a *Society?* And what is the *not being of this world*, but a mark of *independency?* Which indeed the Author of the *Alliance* employs to prove, that the Church and State are *independent* one of another. For was Chriſt's Religion a *Kingdom of this world*, the conſequence would be, that either the State is *dependent* on the Church, or the Church on the State; becauſe, in that caſe, both having COERCIVE POWER, (as all *kingdoms of this world* have) a mutual *independency* would make that ſoleciſm in Politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, *Chriſt's Kingdom not being of this World*, and *his Apoſtles*, as his Lordſhip rightly obſerves, having *no power*, (*beſides Miracles*) *but that of teaching, exhorting, and proteſting againſt infidelity*, i. e. having no *coercive* power,

there remains no pretence for its *dependency* on the State.

His Lordſhip's ſecond Argument againſt the *independency* of the Church is, that Jeſus *ſent out his Apoſtles to teach, and to baptize, and the utmoſt power he gave them, beſides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to ſhake off the duſt of their feet, and to proteſt againſt the infidelity of thoſe who refuſed to receive them, and the Goſpel they publiſhed. The Apoſtles ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them in the ſame Office of teaching and baptizing. The Apoſtles could give no more power than they had received.*

1. He is to prove that Chriſtian Religion did not compoſe a Society by inſtitution. And how does he go about it? By an argument which ſhews it to be a Society by *inſtitution*, tho' without *coercive* power; the very Society which the Author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jeſus ſent out his Apoſtles,—they ordained others to accompany and to ſucceed them.* Here muſt plainly be a Society inſtituted, where you find officers appointed, and a proviſion for their Succeſſion.—*The utmoſt power they had was to teach and baptize thoſe who willingly received the*

Goſpel. Here all *coercive* power is excluded, and that excluſion makes the Society *independent*. What more may be inferred from this account, and which his Lordſhip ſhould have inferred, is, that tho' a Society was inſtituted, yet the particular form of Church-Government was left to human appointment: But he could find no Society of Chriſt's appointment, becauſe he did not ſee a particular form of Church-Government minutely preſcribed, as in the Moſaic Diſpenſation. Tho', had he found ſuch a one, it would, when he leaſt ſuſpected it, have been moſt to his purpoſe; for of ſuch and only of ſuch, he might have ſaid truly, that being *given by God, it is in its nature invariable.*

2. His obſervation, that the *Apoſtles could give no more power than they had received*, inſinuates that the Author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the Church, which is miſrepreſenting his Adverſary, who expreſly holds, that the Church has no ſuch power, while *unallied*; and when *allied*, receives it, in a very limited manner, from the State; and enjoys it no longer than the *Alliance* continues. But theſe miſrepreſentations are things eſſential

to

to his Lordſhip's polemics. Thus again, "To pretend that the Church has a right "to the former [*i. e.* wealth and gran-"dour] by *compact* or by virtue of any "*Alliance* with the State, would be to ſay "whatever comes uppermoſt in a WHIM-"SICAL HEAD. [5]." This is to inſinuate that the Author of the *Alliance pretends that the Church has a right to wealth and grandeur, by virtue of this Alliance.* Now the Author himſelf, where he ſpeaks of the *motives* which the Church had for allying with the State, expreſly affirms, that *the acquiſition of honours, riches, and power could not be one.* His reaſon is, that *it would be impertinent in a Church to aim at them, becauſe they are things a Church could neither uſe nor profit by* [6].

His Lordſhip concludes this long paragraph in theſe words — *No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that paſſed, nor from any thing that theſe men* [the Apoſtles] *did for the maintenance of their Sect, while Chriſtianity was a Sect.* His Lordſhip here forgets, as uſual, the Perſonage he aſſumes, which is that of a Believer, who ſuppoſes, the Apoſtles acted, in all things, by the direction of their

[5] Vol. iv. p. 604. [6] *Alliance*, p. 112.

Maſter:

Maſter: conſequently, *an argument* OF RIGHT MAY *be drawn from every thing that paſſed, and from all they did, in ſupport or maintenance of their Sect while Chriſtianity was a Sect.* It is true, if we ſuppoſe the Apoſtles to be Politicians like his Lordſhip, who put in practice all kind of means to ſupport and maintain their Party, no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing they did. But when God directs the action of his Miniſters in the propagation of Religion, we know from his attributes, that no rights of Humanity or Society will be violated; and conſequently, from every ſuch action, *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his Lordſhip meant no more by his wiſe obſervation than this, That, from what the apoſtles did, to aſſert and maintain the *independency* of Chriſt's Religion, while it remained a Sect, *no argument of right can be drawn* to prove it muſt continue *independent* when it becomes *eſtabliſhed*, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the underſtanding him in this ſenſe, which is, that it ſupports the Theory of the *Alliance*, which, I preſume, was not his Lordſhip's intention. Beſides,

it

it contradicts what he ſo much labours to prove, that, if the *independency* of the Church was of divine inſtitution, the Church could not give it up, when it entered into *Alliance*.

In a word, the whole of his Lordſhip's reaſoning againſt an *Alliance between Church and State*, from the nature of a *Church*, may be reduced to theſe four propoſitions:

1. If Chriſtianity be not a Society by divine inſtitution, it is no Society at all.

2. If Chriſtianity be an independent Society by divine inſtitution, it could not give up its independency to the State.

3. If Chriſtianity be a Society by divine inſtitution, a certain form of Church government muſt be explicitly preſcribed.

4. If ſuch a form be explicitly preſcribed, then that *Form*, and the *Diſcipline* which belongs to it, muſt be as unalterable as the *Doctrine*; which is contrary to the genius of this ſuppoſed *Alliance*.

Now I have ſhewn, that every one of theſe four propoſitions is utterly devoid of all truth and reaſon.

After

After theſe exploits, nothing remained to make his Lordſhip's victory compleat againſt *Alliances* and *Eſtabliſhments*, but to diſcredit that firſt and moſt famous of all, made by CONSTANTINE. " This great Revolution " (ſays he) was effected in part by circum- " ſtances I have mentioned, and by others " that favoured the growth of Chriſtianity. " The imperial Authority did the reſt, but " did it ill, ſo ill, that the chief of thoſe poli- " tical views which CONSTANTINE had in " making this ESTABLISHMENT were de- " feated by it, and the admiſſion of a re- " ligious Society into the State, in the " manner in which he admitted it, was " the cauſe of all the eccleſiaſtical and theo- " logical evils, that have followed from " his time to ours, and that are ſo falſly " imputed to Religion itſelf. We may be " aſſured, that the SOCIETY co-operated " with the COURT, to bring about a Revo- " lution ſo much to their advantage; and " thought themſelves happy enough to be " *dependent*, not *independent* on the Em- " peror; his *inſtruments* not his *allies*, " whatever appearances he might give, or " ſuffer them to aſſume, in thoſe ſolemn " eccleſiaſtical farces, wherein he condeſ-

" cended

" cended to act, in ſome reſpects, a ſe-
" cond part. — But while he recalled to
" his mind, as he did moſt probably, the
" great ſervice Religion was of to ancient
" Rome, he ſeemed to forget, that when
" that Religion flouriſhed, and was of ſo
" much ſervice to the State, it was under
" the immediate inſpection of the State.
" There was no Council but the Senate to
" define Doctrines, nor to regulate Diſci-
" pline. And men were at the head of the
" religious, becauſe they were at the head of
" the civil, adminiſtration; inſtead of being
" at the head of the latter, becauſe they
" were at the head of the former. — He
" [*Conſtantine*] meaned that this [ſpiritual
" power] ſhould be diſtinct from the civil;
" THAT THEY SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT
" OF ONE ANOTHER, and both depen-
" dent on him [7]."

That noble part of Legiſlation, the adjuſting the rights and privileges, the ſettling bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, his Lordſhip, as we ſaid before, ſeems much a ſtranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph makes his *ignorance* but the more notorious, by his trying to diſguiſe it by *Contradictions*.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 432—445.

In

In the eſtabliſhment of Religion under CONSTANTINE, the Church, he ſays, became dependent on the ſupreme civil Magiſtrate. *They thought themſelves happy enough* (ſays he) *to be dependent, not independent on the Emperor; his inſtruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the ſame breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to *act a ſecond part* to theſe his *inſtruments*, or, in other words, to become *theirs:* Nay, he expreſly affirms, that Chriſtianity was on another footing in *new* Rome, than Paganiſm had been in the *old:* Now Paganiſm, he tells us, was the *inſtrument* of the ſupreme Magiſtrate. Chriſtianity then, muſt be an *Ally*, not an *inſtrument* to the ſupreme Magiſtrate. His Lordſhip ſays, this Eſtabliſhment was *ill, very ill, made:* Be that as it will, all the world will allow it, to be here very ill repreſented.—*It defeated all Conſtantine's political views*, all the *good he intended*. This is not unlikely. We have an example before us, his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* throughout, where we find, that *contradictions* can do more; they can defeat all the *evil he intended*.

But if you aſk, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment, the Church is one while, made the *Inſtrument*, and another,

ther, the *Ally* of the civil Magiſtrate? I will tell you. His Lordſhip had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was in FACT, ſuch an Alliance, ſays his Lordſhip. To countenance this aſſertion, CONSTANTINE's *Eſtabliſhment* is repreſented as being made on different terms; terms, whereby the Church became the tool and inſtrument of the civil Magiſtrate. — But then again, he was to ſhew that ſuch an *Alliance* was not of RIGHT, as being very miſchievous to the State: This turns the Tables; and then CONSTANTINE *meaned, that the ſpiritual power ſhould be diſtinct from the civil, and that they ſhould be* INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER (for he all along miſrepreſents the Theory of the *Alliance*, as making the Church keep its *independency* after the Union) — indeed he ſays, and *both dependent on himſelf* [8]; but this was only added to ſoften the contradiction. To ſuch wretched jargon, do his Principles ever and anon reduce him: The Religious and Civil Society are independent of one another; yet the Religious is dependent on the ſupreme Magiſtrate; *i. e.* on him who repre-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 445.

ſents

ſents the civil Society, and is at it's head.

But now let us examine the ſeveral parts of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the contradictions.

He ſays, *the Church was happy enough to be dependent*, NOT INDEPENDENT, *on the Emperor; his Inſtruments, not his Allies.* This ſentence is made up of a *falſe inſinuation*, and a *miſtaken conſequence*. The inſinuation is that the Author of the *Alliance* holds, the *independency* of the Church, on the Magiſtrate, *dureing* an Eſtabliſhment; and that if the Church be *dependent*, it is the *Inſtrument*, not the *Ally*, of the State. The miſtaken conſequence, Grotius (as his Lordſhip finds him quoted by the Author of the *Alliance*) might have prevented. "This (ſays the Author) is what GRO-" TIUS calls *fœdus inæquale*. Inæquale " FOEDUS, hic intelligo quod ex ipſa vi " pactionis MANENTEM PRÆLATIONEM " quandam alteri donat: Hoc eſt ubi quis " tenetur alterius imperium ac majeſtatem " conſervare, ut POTENTIORI PLUS HO-" NORIS, inferiori plus auxilii deferatur.

"*De jur. B.* & *P.* L. i. c. iii. Sect. 21 [9]." Hence, in the opinion of this great Lawyer, it appears, that *alliance* and *dependence* are very conſiſtent.

In ancient Rome, ſays his Lordſhip, *there was no Council, but the Senate, to* DEFINE DOCTRINES, *nor to* REGULATE DISCIPLINE. Now in antient Rome it ſo happened, there were *no doctrines to define*[10]. And as to *Diſcipline*, it was not the *Senate*, but the Colleges of the Prieſts which *regulated* that. When the Senate imagined the neceſſities of State required the obſervance of certain Rites, they ſent to the Prieſts for their directions concerning the *regulation* of them. The ſenate might chuſe whether they would have them celebrated; but if that was their choice, they were tied down to the rules and directions of their ſacred Books.

On the whole, his Lordſhip aſſures us, that CONSTANTINE *eſtabliſhed the Church very ill*, and ſo ſays the Author of the Alliance. Nay, which is more, he explains the cauſes of it.

[9] *Alliance*, p. 88. [10] See *Div. Leg.* B. ii. Sect. 6.

His

His Lordſhip's account of *Conſtantine's* eſtabliſhment, and the Author's account of that by an *Alliance*, ſtand thus,

1. CONSTANTINE *made the church his Inſtruments, not his Allies.* The ALLIANCE makes the Church the Ally, and not the Inſtrument, of the Civil Magiſtrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil Adminiſtration, becauſe they were at the head of the religious.* The ALLIANCE places men at the head of the religious, becauſe they were at the head of the civil.

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himſelf the title of ſupreme head of the Church under God and Chriſt.* The ALLIANCE makes the ſupreme Magiſtrate, head of the Church and Defender of the Faith.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the Church without aſſuming this ſupremacy or headſhip.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the Church, conferred the Supremacy on the civil Magiſtrate.

His Lordſhip's concluſion from all this long ſtory of CONSTANTINE is, that "He and his Succeſſors raiſed that ſpiri-"tual tyranny, which was eſtabliſhed and

" grown into full ſtrength before " CHARLES THE GREAT [1]." And what could we expect leſs when every term in the *Alliance* was violated or neglected? This was juſt as natural as that civil Tyranny ſhould grow to a head, when the terms of the *original contract* between prince and people, had not been adverted to, or obſerved? In a word, the miſchiefs, which, his Lordſhip tells us, followed from *Conſtantine's eſtabliſhment* are the beſt recommendation of the *theory of the Alliance*; a *theory* formed, as it were, and fitted to avoid, and guard againſt, them: It has in fact done ſo, and rendered our preſent Conſtitution of Church and State the moſt happy of any upon the face of the earth.

At laſt, as if on ſet purpoſe to recommend the *Theory of the Alliance*, his Lordſhip concludes his Section concerning CONSTANTINE in theſe words: " Thus it " ſeems to me that the great and funda- " mental error, from whence ſo many " others proceeded, and which CON- " STANTINE COMMITTED IN THE ES-

[1] Vol. iv. p. 446.

" TABLISH-

" TABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIANITY, " was this, *he admitted a Clergy into an* " *eſtabliſhment, on the ſame foot, on which* " *this order had ſtood, while Chriſtianity* " *was the Religion, and theſe men were the* " *heads, the directors, the governors, and* " *magiſtrates of a Sect, by no authority,* " *but that of the Sect itſelf.* He admitted " them veſted with this authority, which " might be neceſſary as long as Chriſtians " made a Sect apart, out of the protection " of the laws; and which became un- " neceſſary and dangerous, when Chriſti- " anity had a legal eſtabliſhment. — The " conduct of Conſtantine on this occaſion " muſt needs appear extremely abſurd to " every one who conſiders the conſe- " quences it had [2]." Can there be a greater encomium on the principles of the *Alliance?* The *fundamental error* of CONSTANTINE'S eſtabliſhment was, the ſuffering the Church to RETAIN IT'S INDEPENDENCY. The *fundamental condition* of eſtabliſhment on the theory of *Alliance* is, that the Church GIVES UP IT'S INDEPENDENCY.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 438—9.

After this, will you not wonder to hear him return again to his abuſe of the ALLIANCE? "The ſole intention and "ſole effect of it [the theologic ſyſtem of the ſchools]" was to eſtabliſh an eccleſiaſti-"cal Empire, under that ſpiritual Monarch "the Pope, and his ſpiritual Miniſters the "Clergy. THIS WAS THE EFFECT OF "THAT SUPPOSED ALLIANCE BETWEEN "THE CHURCH AND STATE [3]."

Before, it was CONSTANTINE *and his Succeſſors, who raiſed that ſpiritual Tyranny* [4]: And it was done, he ſays, by means of *his Eſtabliſhment*; which ſuffered the Church to retain its independency, *and admitted it on the ſame foot on which it had ſtood while it was a ſect* [5]. But now, it is the *ſuppoſed Alliance between Church and State* which raiſed this ſpiritual Tyranny; an *Alliance* which will not *ſuffer* the Church to retain it's independency.

We have ſeen ſuch amazing inſtances of his Lordſhip's *contradictions*, as to be ſurprized at nothing. Sometimes, when

[3] Vol. iv. p. 621—2. [4] Vol. iv. p. 446.
[5] Vol. iv. p. 438.

rapt

rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what the man in the Play did by his *ingratitude*, he ſtrives *to cover the monſtrous bulk of them*, by a proportionable *ſize of words*; ſometimes again he chuſes to follow the advice there given; *to let them go naked, that men may ſee them the better*. Here he formally maſks his double-face, by a premeditated falſification of the Theory of the *Alliance:* He conſtantly avouches it for a fact, or takes it for granted throughout his whole argument againſt the Book, that this Author contends for and maintains the *independency of the Church on the State, under an eſtabliſhment*. This brings CONSTANTINE's Eſtabliſhment, and the Eſtabliſhment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the ſame thing; ſo that the miſchiefs aſcribed to one, may be ſafely transferred to the other.

I have now, Sir, as I promiſed, given You a view of his Lordſhip's POLITICAL TALENTS. The Author whom I have defended againſt him, is no further my concern than as he afforded the occaſion. And leſt he ſhould grow vain on this ſuperior diſtinction of ſeeing himſelf pick-

ed out from amongſt the defenders of Religion, to be immolated, as it were, to the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, let me tell him, that as I defended him for want of a better, ſo his Lordſhip abuſed him, becauſe he could not find a worſe. To ſpeak plainly, his Lordſhip conceived himſelf to have been perſonally affronted by him. And to this conceit, the following words refer, where his Lordſhip takes leave of his Friend, in the laſt volume of his immortal Works, "You "have, I know, at your elbow a *very foul-* "*mouthed and very trifling Critic*, who "will endeavour to IMPOSE UPON YOU "ON THIS OCCASION, AS HE DID ON A "FORMER. He will tell you, again, that "I CONTRADICT myſelf, *&c.* But if the "*dogmatic pedant* ſhould make this ob-"jection, be pleaſed to give him this "anſwer, &c [6]."

Theſe words, you ſee, contain an anecdote; which, as I have the account of it from good hands, I ſhall not ſcruple to lay before you. It may ſerve at leaſt to entertain you, in quality of the Farce to this ſerious Piece.

[6] Vol. v. page the laſt.

Mr.

Mr. POPE had permitted Lord BOLINGBROKE to be conſidered by the public, as his PHILOSOPHER AND GUIDE; and in their converſations concerning the impious complaints againſt Providence, on account of the unequal diſtribution of things, natural and moral, in the preſent Syſtem, they agreed that ſuch complaints were beſt anſwered on the platonic principle of THE BEST. This encouraged the Poet to philoſophiſe: and the fruits of his ſpeculations may be found in the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN. In which, if you will take his Lordſhip's word, Pope was ſo far from putting his proſe into verſe, (as has been invidiouſly ſuggeſted) that he has put Pope's verſe in proſe. They agreed, as we obſerved, in the *principle of the Beſt.* And Mr. Pope thought they had agreed in the queſtion, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has ſince ſhewn, they differed very widely. The *Eſſay on Man* is a real vindication of providence, againſt Libertines and Atheiſts — The *Eſſays on the firſt Philoſophy* are a pretended vindication of Providence againſt an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts. — The Poet directs his argument againſt

againſt Atheiſts and Libertines in ſupport of RELIGION; — The Philoſopher, againſt Divines, in ſupport of NATURALISM. But tho' his Lordſhip thought fit to keep this a ſecret from his Friend, as well as from the Public; yet, after the prodigious ſucceſs of the *Eſſay on Man*, he uſed to make the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongſt their common Acquaintance, as a man who underſtood nothing of his own principles, nor ſaw to what they naturally led. For the truth of this inſtance of his Lordſhip's generoſity, and virtuous emulation in friendſhip, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

While things were in this State, M. de Crouſaz wrote ſome malignant and abſurd *remarks* on the *Eſſay on Man*; accuſing it of Spinoziſm, Naturaliſm, and all the heretical *-iſms* in the Bigot's dictionary. Theſe Remarks, by great chance, fell into the hands of the author of the *Divine Legation*. And mere indignation at an ill natured caviller, put him upon writing a defence of the *firſt epiſtle*. Which, being well received, he was induced to defend the reſt, on the

ſame

ſame principles of natural and revealed Religion, againſt the blundering miſrepreſentations of this Swiſs Philoſopher, and of a certain French tranſlator of the Eſſay into verſe, by whom M. de Crouſaz had been frequently miſled.

Mr. Pope, who was *naturally* on the ſide of Religion, embraced the ſenſe given to the *Eſſay*, by his new Commentator, with the utmoſt pleaſure and ſatisfaction; as appears by the Letters he wrote on that occaſion. You will hardly ſuppoſe, his Lordſhip took the ſame delight in ſeeing his Pupil thus *reaſoned* out of his hands: Or, (what was worſe) in ſeeing him republiſh his Eſſay with a Defence, which put the Poem on the ſide of Religion, and the Poet out of the neceſſity of ſupporting himſelf on his Lordſhip's ſyſtem, when he ſhould condeſcend to impart it to him: Or, (what was worſt of all) in ſeeing him, at the Commentator's inſtance, reſtore a great number of lines ſtruck out of the MS. which no longer left his religious ſentiments equivocal.

It was this chagrine which occaſioned his Lordſhip, (when he NEW MODELED the *introductory Letter to his Eſſays, addreſſed*

to

to Mr. Pope) to end it in this manner, " I cannot conclude my diſcourſe on this " occaſion better than by *putting you in* " *mind* of a paſſage you quoted to me *once* " with great applauſe from a ſermon of " FORSTER, and to this effect, Where " *myſtery* begins, *religion* ends. The " Apophthegm pleaſed me much, and I " was glad to hear ſuch a truth from any " pulpit, ſince it ſhews an inclination at " at leaſt, to purify Chriſtianity from the " leaven of *artificial Theology*; which con- " ſiſts principally in making things that are " very plain, myſterious; and in pretend- " ing to make things that are impenetra- " bly myſterious, very plain. *If you con-* " *tinue ſtill of the ſame mind, I ſhall have* " *no excuſe to make to you, for what I have* " *written, and ſhall write. Our opinions* " *coincide. If you have changed your mind,* " *think again and examine further.* You " will find it is the MODEST, not the PRE- " SUMPTUOUS, Enquirer who makes a real " and ſafe progreſs in the diſcovery of di- " vine truths. One follows Nature and " Nature's God; that is, he follows God " in his Works, and in his Word; nor pre- " ſumes to go further, by *metaphyſical and*

" *theological*

" *theological commentaries of his own in-*
" *vention*, than the two texts, if I may
" uſe this expreſſion, carry him very evi-
" dently. — They who have done other-
" wiſe, have been either ENTHUSIASTS or
" KNAVES [7]." *I. E.* It is I, who am the modeſt Enquirer, who follow nature and nature's God; not your preſumptuous Commentator, who is an *enthuſiaſt* or a *knave*. But alas! this kind admonition came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a better *guide* than either FORSTER or his LORDSHIP. I mean, Mr. LOCKE, who, in the concluſion of his firſt Letter to Biſhop Stillingfleet, had taught the Poet to anſwer thus, " I know not any thing
" more diſingenuous, than not publicly
" to own a conviction one has received,
" concerning any thing erroneous in what
" one has printed; nor can there, I think,
" be a greater offence againſt Mankind
" than to propagate a falſhood, whereof
" one is convinced; eſpecially in a matter
" wherein Men are highly concerned not
" to be miſled. The holy Scripture is to
" me, and always will be, the conſtant
" GUIDE of my aſſent; and I ſhall always
" hearken to it, as containing infallible

[7] Vol. iv. p. 344.

" truth,

" truth, relating to things of the higheſt
" concernment. *And I wiſh I could ſay*
" *there were no* MYSTERIES *in it. I acknow-*
" *there are, to me,* and I fear always will
" be. But where I want the evidence of
" things, there yet is ground enough for
" me to believe, becauſe God has ſaid it:
" and I ſhall preſently condemn and quit
" any opinion of mine, aſſoon as I am
" ſhewn that it is contrary to any Revela-
" tion in the holy Scripture [8]."

But the Author of the *Divine Legation* ſoon after committed a much more heinous offence againſt his Lordſhip's philoſophic Dignity. And to this, the following words, quoted above, allude: *You have, I know, at your elbow, a very foul-mouthed and a very trifling Critic, who will endeavour to impoſe upon you on this occaſion, as he did on a* FORMER.

About the year 1742, a little before Lord Bolingbroke's return to England, this *Critic* was with Mr. Pope at T. who ſhewed him a printed book of *Letters on the Study and uſe of Hiſtory*, and deſired his opinion of it. It was the firſt volume of the work ſince publiſhed under that name. Mr. W. on turning it over, told him his

[8] *Locke's Works*, Vol. i. p. 405.

thoughts of it with great freedom. What he ſaid to Mr. Pope of the main ſubject is not material: but of the digreſſion concerning the Authenticity of the Old Teſtament, he obſerved to his friend, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from other Writers; and had been confuted again and again, to the entire ſatisfaction of the learned world: that, the Author of theſe *Letters*, whoever he was, had miſtaken ſome of thoſe reaſonings; had miſrepreſented others; and had added ſuch miſtakes of his own, as muſt diſcredit him with the learned, and diſhonour him with all honeſt men: that therefore, as he underſtood the Author was his friend, he could not do him a better ſervice than adviſe him to ſtrike out this *digreſſion*, which had nothing to do with his ſubject, and would ſet half his Readers againſt the work, whenever it ſhould be publiſhed. Mr. Pope ſaid, his friend, (whoſe name he kept ſecret,) was the moſt candid of men; and that the Author of the D. L. could not do him a greater pleaſure than to tell him his thoughts freely on this occaſion. He urged this ſo warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then alone,

alone, ſcribled over half a dozen ſheets of paper before he roſe from the table, where they were ſitting. Mr. Pope read what he had written; and, as he had a wonderful partiality for thoſe he thought well of, he approved it: and to convince the *Scribler*, (as my Lord rightly calls him) that he did ſo, he took up the printed Volume and croſſed out the whole *digreſſion* with his pen. It was written, as you may well ſuppoſe, with all the civility, the writer was likely to uſe to a friend Mr. Pope appeared much to reverence: but the word *prevarication*, or ſomething like it, chanced, it ſeems, to eſcape his pen. The papers were ſent to Paris; and received with unparalleled indignation. Little broke out; but ſomething did; and Mr. Pope found he had not paid his court by this officious ſervice. However, with regard to the Writer of the papers, all was carried, when his Lordſhip came over (as he ſoon afterwards did,) with ſingular politeneſs; and ſuch a ſtrain of compliment as men are wont to beſtow on thoſe, whoſe homage they intend to gain. Yet all this time, his Lordſhip was meditating and compiling an angry and elaborate anſwer to this private, haſty, and impertinent,

tho' well meant, *Scribble:* and it was as much as They could do, who had moſt intereſt with him, to perſuade him at length to burn it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble Perſon, one of the greateſt Characters of this, or indeed, of any Age; who being much courted by his Lordſhip, was for ſome time able, and at all times moſt deſirous, of reſtraining the extravagance of that *firſt Philoſophy*, which he deteſted and deſpiſed.

The event has ſince ſhewn, that it had been happy for his Lordſhip's reputation, had the advice, to ſtrike out the *Digreſſion*, been followed; as it is that which has chiefly ſunk him in the popular opinion; and loſt him the merit of the very beſt of all his Compoſitions.

Mr. Pope, however, was ſtill courted and careſſed. And the vengeance treaſured up againſt him for the impiety of eraſing thoſe ſacred pages, broke not out till the Poet's death: then indeed it came with redoubled vehemence, and on the moſt ridiculous pretence. Pope had, as his Lordſhip ſaid, unknown to him, printed an Edition of the *Patriot Prince*, or *Patriot King*, (for it had two titles, as his Lordſhip's various occaſions required) a

very innocent thing, which might have been publiſhed by the common Cryer, without the leaſt offence. To ſay the truth, it was a mere School-declamation, which, in great pomp of words, informs us of this Secret, *That if a Prince could but be once brought to love his Country he would always act for the good of it.* There was the appearance too of very odd practice to give a colour of neceſſity for the publiſhing this wonderful diſcovery. However, it was done; and the memory of Pope traduced in ſo cruel a manner, that the Reader is ſuffered to conclude, that even CURL himſelf could not have acted a more faithleſs or mercenary part: for it muſt be owned, his Lordſhip has dealt one equal meaſure to his COUNTRY, his RELIGION, and his FRIEND. And why was all this outrage? To ſpeak the worſt of the offence, it was one of thoſe private offices of indiſcreet good will, which generous men are always ready to forgive, even when they ſee themſelves moſt incommoded by it.

The Public ſtood amazed. And thoſe who had any regard for the Poet's Memory, waited with impatience to ſee who, of his *old* Friends, would reſcue it from his Lordſhip's

Lordſhip's fangs. Contempt of ſo cruel a treatment, I ſuppoſe, kept them ſilent. However, the ſame contempt at length provoked an Anonymous Writer to publiſh a Letter to the *Editor of the Patriot King*; for his Lordſhip had thought proper to divide himſelf into the two perſonages of *Editor* and *Author*. This Letter, written with all the decorum and reſpect due to his Lordſhip's Station and Character, he thought fit to aſcribe to the Author of the *Divine Legation*; ſo that you need not wonder if it expoſed the ſuſpected writer to all his Lordſhip's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his Sycophants; of which, ſome, that was ſaid to paſs through his Lordſhip's hands, was in language bad enough to diſgrace Goals and Garrets.

You have here, SIR, the Anecdote I promiſed you. And now I ſhall releaſe you from this tedious Subject. I have compleated my *View of his Lordſhip's Philoſophy*; which I choſe to addreſs to You in compliance with his challenge; where he appeals, from *Artificial Theology* and *School-Learning*, to the breaſt of the plain honeſt Man,

"Slave to no Sect, who takes no private road,
"But looks through nature up to nature's God;

to

to him whoſe heart is filled with the love of God and Man. To this Tribunal he appeals, and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it You will tell us. I greatly ſuſpect, that of all his Principles you are not likely to approve more than what you find in the following declaration, which breaks out unexpectedly from amidſt the corruption of party politics, and in all likelyhood was ingendered by them. SOME MEN THERE ARE, THE PESTS OF SOCIETY I THINK THEM, WHO PRETEND A GREAT REGARD TO RELIGION IN GENERAL, BUT WHO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF DECLAIMING PUBLICKLY AGAINST THAT SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST AGAINST THAT CHURCH-ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RECEIVED IN BRITAIN [2].

I am, &c.

[2] *Diſſertation on Parties*, p. 148. 8vo. Edit.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

P. 136. l. 15. for *haman* read *human*.
P. 159. l. laſt, for *natural* read *national*.
P. 174. l. 23. for *bounds* read *the bounds*.